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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we highlight for the first time some of the
significant but hitherto unrecognized behavioral effects of copyright
law on individuals' incentives to create and then examine the
implications of our findings for the constitutional analysis of Eldred
v. Ashcroft We show that behavioral biases-namely, individuals'
optimistic bias regarding their future longevity and their subadditive
judgments in circumstances resembling the extant rule of copyright
duration-explain the otherwise puzzling lifetime-plus-years basis
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for copyright protection given to individual authors, and reveal how
this regime provides superior incentives to create. Thus, insofar as
the provision of increased incentives to individual authors is socially
desirable, a lifetime-plus-years rule is a more effective legal means
of accomplishing this goal than a rule based on a fixed term of years
of a comparable expected duration.
We also find, however, that the behavioral efficacy of a lifetime-
plus-years regime does not apply to the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA), which merely extends the "years" component of an
already existing lifetime-plus-years rule. Drawing on empirical
findings on intertemporal choice, as well as our preceding analysis
of the lifetime-plus-years regime and our own experimental tests, we
determine that the CTEA's prospective extension provides negligible
additional incentives to individual authors. We conclude the
extension is unjustified on incentive-provision grounds, a finding of
relevance to the Court's determination in Eldred v. Ashcroft of the
constitutionality of the CTEA under the Copyright Clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we begin developing, for the first time, a
behavioral economic approach to copyright law.' Based on robust
findings from the psychology of human judgment and decision-
making, we construct an empirically based framework for examining
how different copyright regimes impact individual authors'
incentives to create. Our framework explains, although not
necessarily justifies, the otherwise puzzling, unique regime
controlling the works of individual authors under extant copyright
law and clarifies the limits of copyright duration as a means for
providing monetary incentives to create.
2
1. The analysis in this Article is based, in part, on new experimental
evidence and analyses we report elsewhere. See Avishalom Tor & Dotan
Oliar, Introducing a Behavioral Approach to Copyright Law: Behavioral
Economic Analysis and Experimental Tests of Alternative Duration Regimes
(May 10, 2002) (manuscript in preparation, data tables and statistical analyses
on file with authors).
2. While the present analyses focuses on pecuniary incentives, it is largely
applicable to non-pecuniary incentives as well.
INCENTIVES TO CREATE
The provision of incentives to create-that fundamental goal of
copyright law 3-is especially suited for a behavioral economic
analysis, given its intrinsically empirical nature. Is copyright regime
A likely to provide greater incentives to create than copyright regime
B? And which of these two regimes better balances the provision of
incentives to create against the social costs of the copyright system?
We believe that these and similar questions are best answered by
reference to empirical, scientific observations on human behavior.
Our analysis first highlights a previously unnoticed puzzle in the
structure of copyright law, showing that the lifetime-plus-years basis
for determining the duration of individual authors' copyright makes
little economic sense given copyright's goal of providing incentives
to create. 4  Unlike the rule governing other creators-such as
patentees or authors of "works made for hire," whose copyright
subsists for a fixed term of years from a legally defined moments-
individual authors cannot know in advance the duration of their
copyright. Instead, their copyright expires after the passing of a
fixed number of years following their death.
6
Therefore, rational individual authors facing an uncertain
lifetime-plus-years rule under which their copyright duration
depends on their longevity will discount the value of their copyright
to account for this increased risk. They will perceive such a regime,
where they are required to gamble their investment in creation on
3. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 477 (1984). For a discussion of the role of incentives in copyright law see
infra Part II.A. 1.
4. Legal scholars have pointed out that the different duration regimes of
copyright law as well as the differences between these regimes and the
duration of protection given to other forms of intellectual property, such as
patents, are puzzling. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at ch. 12, p.
23, on file with authors) ("[w]hy... the duration of [copyright] protection
should be so much more generous than for patents, is not evident, and one
surmises that it has no clear rationale.").
5. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000) (extending copyrights for works
made for hire for the shortest of ninety-five years from publication of the work
or 120 years from its creation); id. § 154(a)(2) (patents are in force from the
moment the patent issues until the passing of 20 years from the date the patent
application was filed).
6. See id. § 302(a) (under the CTEA, individual authors enjoy a copyright
term beginning from a work's creation and lasting for the author's lifetime plus
seventy years).
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their longevity, as providing them diminished incentives to create
compared to an alternative, less risky, fixed-term copyright regime of
a comparable expected duration.7
The puzzling lifetime-plus-years duration rule not only
diminishes authors' incentives to create, but also fails to reduce the
social cost of copyright. It distorts the incentives provided to
different types of potential authors, depending on an arbitrary
variable-their expected longevity-while simultaneously
generating no lesser, and possibly even greater, social costs.
8
From a traditional economic perspective, therefore, the law's
application of a unique duration regime that provides inferior
incentives for individual authors to create at a potentially higher
social cost seems puzzling, especially given the law's application of
a different regime to other creators.
The behavioral economic analysis of copyright law provides an
answer to this puzzling choice of regime. It recognizes that potential
authors, like other individuals, are "boundedly rational," 9 being
7. Importantly, the lifetime-plus-years puzzle does not necessarily apply to
a comparison between a lifetime-only and a comparable fixed-term regime.
Although creators would face a higher degree of risk when faced with a
lifetime-only duration versus a comparable fixed-term duration rule, some of
them might still prefer the higher-risk lifetime regime. These creators will opt
for the riskier alternative if they value income during their lives significantly
more than income to their heirs after their death, since the lifetime regime
guarantees income throughout their lives under all circumstances, while the
benefits of a fixed-term period to their heirs if they were to die early would be
outweighed by the loss of income during their own lives if they were to die
late. The same analysis applies, moreover, to a lifetime-plus-years regime that
provides only a small number of years beyond the authors' lifetime, where a
comparable fixed term would not provide a virtual guarantee of payments
throughout the author's life, depending on the length on the "years"
component, the distribution of authors' life expectancies, and the ratio of the
utility to authors from benefits to themselves versus benefits to their heirs. See
Tor & Oliar, supra note 1; see also Nicolas Drouhin, Lifetime Uncertainty and
Time Preference, 51 THEORY & DECISION 145, 145-46 (2001) (criticizing the
common assumption of lifetime certainty in models of choice, offering a
simple model that takes lifetime uncertainty into account, and showing its
effects on rational agents' decision-making).
8. For a brief explanation and discussion of the various costs generated by
copyright see infra Part II.A.2.
9. We use a broad definition of "bounded rationality," a concept that was
introduced by Herbert A. Simon. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational
Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 129 (1958).
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affected by motivation and emotion and possessing only limited
mental resources. Boundedly rational authors must employ
simplifying decision heuristics while attempting to make the best
judgments and decisions they can. These heuristics, which enable
them to function reasonably well in complex environments, also lead
individual authors to commit systematic, predictable errors of
judgment, 10
Using a behavioral approach, we show how two such
psychological processes, known as optimistic bias and subadditivity,
combine to make potential authors prone to overestimate the period
during which they will enjoy the benefits of copyright under a
lifetime-plus-years regime, but not under a comparable fixed-term
one." I  Boundedly rational authors thus perceive the objectively
In Simon's terminology, however, bounded rationality denoted only the purely
cognitive limitations of the human mind. See also Avishalom Tor, The Fable
of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101
MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming Nov. 2002) (manuscript at 4 n.2 on file with
authors) (discussing the distinction between these broader and narrower
definitions in greater detail).
10. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (emphasis
added) (stating that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting
values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite
useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors."). Thus, Jolls
et al. explain:
Bounded rationality.., refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive
abilities are not infinite... [P]eople sometimes respond rationally to
their own cognitive limitations... [b]ut even with these remedies, and
in some cases because of these remedies, human behavior differs in
systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic model
of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental shortcuts is
rational, it can produce predictable mistakes.
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1471, 1477 (1998) (emphasis added) (explaining how law and
economics could be enhanced by increasing their attention to insights about
actual human behavior).
11. Significantly, the behavioral phenomena we discuss in this Article are
not the only ones bearing important implications for copyright law. For
instance, the various psychological processes that lead to overconfident
behaviors often lead creators to overestimate the amount of annual income they
will obtain from creation and the period throughout which they will obtain this
copyright income, irrespective of their overestimates of copyright duration
under the extant lifetime-plus-years regime. Since the present Article focuses
on the extant duration regime of copyright granted to individual authors,
Fall 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:437
inferior former regime as providing them with greater incentives to
create than the latter regime. We further buttress this empirically
based conclusion by conducting experimental tests of the relative
attractiveness of these two regimes.
After applying the behavioral framework we develop to explain
the lifetime-plus-years puzzle, we examine the implications of our
findings together with other behavioral evidence on intertemporal
choice and our own experimental test for the analysis of the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA). 12 We show how
the CTEA's prospective extension of copyright to individual authors
from a term of the author's lifetime plus fifty years to a term of the
author's lifetime plus seventy years provides little additional
incentive to create.
Summing up the empirical evidence, we conclude that the
CTEA's prospective extension given to individual authors increases
the social costs of copyright without providing a significant increase
in its benefits. In our concluding remarks we also show how some
aspects of our analysis can be extended to the other prospective
extensions under the CTEA. We find that the extended fixed term of
copyright awarded to works made for hire provides no significantly
greater incentives to create than those fixed-term incentives which
the pre-CTEA regime had provided.
We submit that our empirically based conclusions are relevant
for the constitutional analysis of whether the CTEA complies with
the limited mandate given Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" in Eldred v. Ashcroft.13 Thus, although this
Article does not focus on the CTEA's retrospective extension-
which stands at the heart of the constitutional challenge in Eldred-
the finding that even the prospective extension under the CTEA
provides few additional incentives to create may be helpful to the
Court when considering Congress's reasons for passing the CTEA.
To wit, because the prospective extension has had a role in justifying
the Act as a whole, the conclusion that this extension cannot stand on
however, we leave the analysis of this and other significant behavioral effects
for another time.
12. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
13. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
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incentive-providing grounds casts doubt on the justification of the
retrospective extension as well.
14
Our Article therefore seeks to accomplish a number of
complementary goals. First, it develops a broadly applicable
behavioral economic approach to copyright law specifically and
intellectual property in general. We find the application of this
approach especially suited for evaluating the impact of the law's
grant of intellectual property rights on individuals' incentives to
create.
Second, it exposes a puzzling feature of copyright law and
provides a compelling behavioral explanation, although not
necessarily a justification, for its continued presence.' 5
Third, it further draws on the behavioral framework we develop
to examine the efficacy of the prospective duration extension under
the CTEA, finding the Act ineffective and costly-a conclusion of
relevance for the constitutional analysis in Eldred.
Fourth and last, this Article demonstrates the potential
contribution of a behavioral approach to legal analysis in the
14. Thus, one of the reasons given at the introduction of the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1995 (the CTEA's predecessor) was "to provide a
sufficient incentive for the creation of new works of authorship." 141 CONG.
REC. S3390 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). This reason
was also cited in two committee reports as justifying the Act. See S. REP. No.
104-315, at 12 (1996) ("the promise of additional income will increase existing
incentives to create new and derivative works"); H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 4
(1998) ("[e]xtending copyright protection will be an incentive for U.S. authors
to continue using their creativity to produce works...").
Moreover, scholars have already pointed out that the prospective
extensions have been instrumental in justifying their retrospective counterparts
throughout the various statutory extensions of the copyright term. See, e.g.,
Symposia, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is
Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 651, 694 (2000) ("since 1790, it
has indeed been Congress's policy that the author of yesterday's work should
not get a lesser reward than the author of tomorrow's work just because
Congress passed a statute lengthening the term today. That has always been a
rule of equity that Congress has followed since 1790") (footnote omitted); see
also Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I
Stayed Too Long?," 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 996 (2000) (arguing that "the
prospective copyright term extension was only a stalking, or even a Trojan
horse, for the retrospective extension the bill brought to these owners of pre-
existing works").
15. As we explain infra Part II.A.2., while we find that a lifetime-plus-years
rule provides increased incentives to create, our analysis does not determine
the absolute optimality of this duration regime.
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constitutional arena-a domain that behaviorally informed legal
scholarship has yet to explore.' 6 We propose that insofar as the
Constitution is concerned with regulating human conduct, the neglect
of empirical behavioral findings may lead to incomplete, even
mistaken, applications of constitutional principles to specific legal
rules.
Structurally, this Article consists of four parts. In Part I, we
highlight the puzzling nature of the lifetime-plus-years regime of
copyright duration. In Part II, we demonstrate how a behavioral
approach to copyright law provides a compelling explanation for this
puzzle. Then, in Part III, we rely on the behavioral framework
developed in Part II together with additional empirical evidence to
expose the limited influence of the CTEA's prospective extension of
far-future benefits on individual authors' present incentives to create.
Finally, in Part IV, we sum up our findings and briefly apply them to
the other prospective extensions under the CTEA, concluding that
the various prospective extensions cannot be justified on incentive-
providing grounds.
II. THE PUZZLING LIFETIME-PLUS-YEARS REGIME OF COPYRIGHT
DURATION
In this Part, we explain why a lifetime-plus-years regime of
copyright duration appears inferior to a comparable fixed-term
regime as a means for providing individual authors with incentives to
create. We begin by reviewing the incentive-providing function of
copyright law. Next, we show how a lifetime-plus-years regime
imposes an additional risk on rational authors, diminishing their
incentives to create. We conclude this Part by highlighting some of
the additional social costs of the lifetime-plus-years regime, which
make the choice of this regime of copyright protection even more
puzzling.
16. It is telling, for instance, that a recent article reviewing a large number
of behavioral applications in legal scholarship across a variety of doctrinal
fields cites no application in constitutional law. See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998).
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A. Incentives to Create: The Costly and Limited Efficacy of
Copyright
1. The importance of providing incentives to create
The justification for and the reasoning behind Copyright
legislation is primarily utilitarian-economic. Copyright law aims to
induce potential authors to benefit society by creating expressive
works. Thus, while other approaches to intellectual property exist,
17
the Constitution, the courts, and legal scholars all recognize the
centrality of providing appropriate incentives for the creation of such
socially valuable information.18
The Constitution vests in Congress the power to enact copyright
legislation "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
19
This foundational principle of copyright law has been elaborated on
by the Supreme Court, which stated that "[c]opyright is based on the
belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their
works, they are given an incentive to create" 20 and that the
"'encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts."'
21
17. See, e.g., William W. Fisher 1II, Theories of Intellectual Property, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (providing an overview and analyzing four
major theoretical approaches to intellectual property); Peter Menell,
Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit D. Geest eds., 2000)
(reviewing various theories of intellectual property).
18. For an introduction to the economic-utilitarian analysis of copyright law
see SHAVELL, supra note 4; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989); see
also Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 189 (reviewing economic-utilitarian
analyses of copyright).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477
(1984).
21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28
(1932); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858) (referring to
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Conventional economic wisdom teaches us that the creation of
works of the intellect is socially desirable whenever the social value
of these works outweighs the social costs associated with their
production. 22 However, economics also reveals that the information
embodied in new works is a public good: The consumption of
information is both non-rivalrous-meaning that many can enjoy a
copyrighted work without it being used up-and partially non-
excludable-meaning that it is costly, and sometimes impossible, to
exclude non-payers or limit their access to information.
23
Because information is non-rivalrous and partially non-
excludable, if the free copying of works by the public were legal, the
price of a copyrighted work that reached the market would be driven
down to the marginal cost of making its copy-a relatively small
amount-instead of a higher price embodying the cost of producing
the information. Anticipating their inability to charge more than the
very low marginal cost of copying, however, many authors would
decline to invest in creation, and the social level of authorship would
tend to be inadequate, resulting in a social loss. 24
Copyright law responds to this potential problem by providing
authors with the right to prevent the free copying and enjoyment of
their works, allowing them to recoup their investment in authorship.
Given copyright, therefore, the price of these works will be higher
patents); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832) (referring to
patents).
22. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39-50 (5th ed.
1998) (discussing the costs and benefits of extending property and intellectual
property rights); SHAVELL, supra note 4; see also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 520
(1990) ("Under the economic copyright model, the propriety of copyright's
expansion rests solely on an economic cost-benefit calculation. Courts should
allow copyright to expand as long as the benefits of increased creative activity
outweigh its costs.").
23. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
42-43, 126-28 (3d ed. 2000).
24. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 4 (examining the social advantage
of intellectual property rights). For additional formulations of this argument
see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994-95 (1997); Michael Meurer,
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 94 (2001).
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than the marginal cost of producing a copy, bringing about a better
alignment of private and social incentives to create.
25
2. Evaluating regimes of copyright duration
Copyright law's central goal is to confer on authors such rights
that strike an optimal balance between the desire to provide authors
with incentives to create and the desire to allow society access to
works of authorship. 26  The economic analysis of intellectual
property also shows that copyright protection generates a series of
social benefits and costs. 27 Consequently, determining the optimal
scope and duration 28 of copyright becomes a difficult, complex
task.29
25. Moreover, empirical evidence relating to the adoption, abolition, and
marked shifts in intellectual property regimes worldwide supports the positive
correlation between intellectual property protection and enhanced creation.
During the French Revolution, for example, copyright was abolished, resulting
in an almost complete halt in the production of books and serious journals. See
Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 965 (1999). But see Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284-323 (1970) (questioning the
extent to which copyright in books fosters creativity).
26. See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 326 ("Striking the correct
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright
law."); see also William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1698-1744 (1988) (discussing the economics of
copyright protection); Dotan Oliar, Fair Use Doctrine Over the Internet: An
Economic Analysis of the Interchangeability of Duration and Scope In
Copyright Protection (2001) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School)
(on file with authors) (analyzing the economics of copyright law and applying
the the analysis to the Internet).
27. See generally Fisher, supra note 17 (discussing four major theoretical
approaches to intellectual property); Menell, supra note 17 (reviewing various
theories of intellectual property).
28. Note that although duration and scope are the most obvious
determinants of the copyright entitlement, they are not the only ones. See, e.g.,
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis
of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740-41 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Who Decides the Extent of Rights in
Intellectual Property?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 405, 406
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES] ("What is the right length of a copyright? No one knows.");
Fisher, supra note 26, at 1739. In fact, copyright protection may be altogether
inferior to alternative means of providing incentives to create, for example,
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The exclusive rights conferred upon authors generate several
kinds of social costs. 30 First, these rights often confer monopolistic
power to authors, resulting in the higher, monopolistic pricing of
works to consumers with an attendant deadweight loss. 31 Second,
copyright protection generates administrative costs, such as the
operation of the Copyright Office; litigation and enforcement costs
due to disputes over copyrights and the need to subject infringers to
civil and criminal penalties; and tracing costs that consumers and
potential authors must bear to determine whether a particular work
they seek to enjoy or use is copyrighted.32 Third, the copyright
system might draw excessive social resources towards authorship, at
the expense of other, more valuable, social investment alternatives.33
Fourth, some commentators assert that the grant of copyright to
current works makes the creation of future works that are based in
part on current works more costly, 34 and provides disincentives to
improve existing works of authorship. 35 Last, the copyright system
also generates additional transaction costs, incurred during the sale or
licensing of these rights.
36
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) or to a no-protection system, for example,
Breyer, supra note 25, at 350-51 (examining a question outside the scope of
this Article).
30. See generally Gordon & Bone, supra note 18, at 194-96 (discussing the
costs of monopoly pricing, chilling of future creativity, transaction costs of
licensing, and costs of administration and enforcement).
31. Deadweight loss is the foregone social surplus caused by the pricing out
of the market of individuals who are willing to pay more than the information's
marginal cost, but less than its monopolistic price. It results when authors
cannot price-discriminate perfectly and charge each buyer the value that buyer
attaches to the consumption of the work. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 26, at
1702.
32. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 135-36; Landes & Posner,
supra note 18, at 361-62.
33. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 556-61 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 332-33. See also Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 394-412 (1999)
(analyzing the disparate impact that the expansion of copyright protection
entails for the authorship costs of different types of authors).
35. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 24, at 990-92.
36. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of
Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1605-13
(1995).
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Different duration rules are therefore likely to generate different
benefits and costs. For example, a given increase in duration may
increase incentives to create, bringing about a better balance between
the benefits and costs of copyright. Such a duration increase,
however, may also provide excessive incentives to create and
generate excessive social costs, bringing about a worse copyright
regime.
37
Nevertheless, one can draw some conclusions as to the relative
social desirability of different duration regimes regardless of their
absolute merits. For instance, one regime is inferior to another when
the former diminishes authors' incentives to create without providing
society with compensating benefits. 38  Under these narrow
circumstances, society would be well advised not to choose the
inferior regime over its superior counterpart, irrespective of their
absolute merits.
Ironically, a traditional economic analysis suggests the extant
lifetime-plus-years regime of copyright duration is just that-a
seemingly inferior regime of copyright duration that never should
have been put in place.
B. How the Lifetime-Plus-Years Regime Appears Inferior to a Fixed-
Term Regime of Comparable Expected Duration
1. A brief typology of copyright duration regimes
The duration of copyright protection may be based on a variety
of different rules, as the history of American copyright law
37. Moreover, any increase in copyright duration further diminishes public
access to copyrighted creations and inevitably inflates the attendant costs of the
copyright monopoly. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the
Public Domain: Markets in Information Goods Versus the Marketplace of
Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES, supra note 29, at 271 ("[M]ainstream
economics very clearly negates the superstition that if some property rights in
information are good, then more rights in information are even better.").
38. Of course, this conclusion would not apply if the higher-incentives
regime were to provide excessive incentives that generate social losses, while
the lower-incentives regime were to provide optimal incentives. The present
analysis is limited, however, to the question of why the law would use a
regime that seems to diminish incentives to create without reducing the
attendant social costs of the copyright system. We can answer this question
without determining what absolute level of incentives is socially desirable.
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illustrates. 39 Importantly, however, we would like to compare two
archetypal regimes of copyright duration-the fixed-term regime and
the lifetime-plus-years regime.
Under a simple fixed-term regime, creations are protected for an
invariable period of years from a legally defined moment,
40
independently of the occurrence of any later event other than the
passage of time.41 Such a fixed term can be as short as the twenty-
eight year maximal copyright term under the original 1790 Act42 or
even shorter; it may also be as long as the ninety-five year protection
of works made for hire, anonymous works, or pseudonymous works
under the CTEA, or even longer.
43
39. For instance, the copyright term shifted from fourteen years, extendable
for fourteen more, see Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124, to
twenty-eight years extendable for fourteen more, see Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.
16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436, 436, to twenty-eight years extendable to twenty-eight
more, see Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1015, 1080, for lifetime
of the author plus fifty years. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)), to
lifetime plus seventy years (17 U.S.C. 302(a)). Also, the term of copyright
was initially counted from the filing of a prepublication title page of the work
with the clerk of the district court where the author resided (from 1790 to
1869) or with the Library of Congress (from 1870 to 1908), then from the date
of first publication of the work (from 1909 to 1977), then from the work's
creation (1978 to date). For an overview of the different copyright regimes in
the United States since 1790, see, for example, William F. Patry, The
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal
the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996).
40. For simplicity, we assume that works enjoy automatic copyright
protection from "creation." In practice, however, a variety of legally defined
moments may apply. See, e.g., examples, supra note 39. Our comparison of
the different copyright duration regimes is therefore independent of the
specific legal rule according to which the copyright period begins to run.
41. More complex regimes may combine a fixed-term rule with a rule
allowing for another fixed-term extension, creating an "extendable fixed-term
regime," as has been the case under the 1831 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 302
(providing twenty-eight years, extendable for fourteen more). Still other
regimes may combine a fixed-term regime with a lifetime (or any other) limit,
creating a "truncated fixed-term regime," as did the 1790 Act. See § 1, 1 Stat.
at 124 (providing fourteen years of initial protection, extendable to fourteen
more only if the author were still alive). While we do not examine these
variant regimes in detail, the comparison of the simple fixed-term regime with
its lifetime-plus counterpart could be easily extended to these cases.
42. See § 1, 1 stat. at 124.
43. These works are protected under the CTEA for a term of ninety-five
years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. See
17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
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Since the 1976 Act,4 4 however, the duration of copyright
protection for individual creations has been determined on a lifetime-
plus-years basis, where works are protected for the lifetime of the
author plus an additional period of a fixed number of years after the
author's death.45 The CTEA has extended this additional period,
which amounted to fifty years under the 1976 Act, by another twenty
years, resulting in an overall copyright duration of the author's
lifetime plus seventy years for individual authors.46
2. A lifetime-plus-years regime imposes an additional risk on
authors
The 1976 introduction of a lifetime-plus-years regime is
puzzling, since this regime imposes a seemingly unnecessary risk on
potential authors, diminishing their incentives to create. In fact, any
given lifetime-plus-years regime inevitably imposes a greater risk on
authors in comparison to a fixed-term regime whose term is the
average life expectancy of authors plus a period equal to the "years"
47
period of the lifetime-plus-years regime.
A lifetime-plus-years regime increases the risk of investment in
creation because it increases the variability of the distribution of
future returns on creation compared to a fixed-term regime. Under
the lifetime-plus-years regime, the returns on the investment in
creation are a function of the author's longevity: a long-lived author
enjoys a longer period of returns, while a short-lived author enjoys
only a shorter period. The fixed-term regime, on the other hand,
provides all authors the same period of returns irrespective of their
eventual longevity.
Importantly, where the period of the fixed-term regime equals
the average life expectancy of authors plus the same number of
additional "years" that the lifetime-plus-years regime provides, the
expected returns on investment in authorship are the same under both
regimes. Authors of an average longevity will therefore face similar
44. See 90 Stat. at 2541.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
46. See id.
47. For example, if the identical "plus" period of both regimes were fifty
years, and the average life expectancy of creators were thirty years, a lifetime-
plus-years regime would provide creators with lifetime plus fifty years of
copyright protection, while a comparable fixed-term regime would provide all
creators with eighty (that is, fifty plus thirty) years of protection.
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returns in both cases, while their long- and short-lived counterparts
will face higher and lower returns, respectively, under the lifetime-
plus-years regime.
However, potential authors cannot know with certainty how
long they will live at the time they must decide whether to invest in
authorship. Consequently, the lifetime-plus-years regime forces
them to bear the additional risk of gambling on their longevity in
addition to the already present uncertainty inherent in any investment
in authorship.48
For example, if the average life expectancy of authors were
thirty years, with actual longevity ranging from ten to fifty years, and
given a "plus" period of fifty years, a lifetime-plus-years regime
would provide authors with variable periods of returns, ranging from
sixty years for short-lived authors to one hundred years for their
long-lived counterparts. A comparable fixed-term regime, on the
other hand, would provide all authors with eighty years of returns
irrespective of their actual longevity.
Rational authors, however, would not seek to gamble their
investments in creation on their future longevity, exposing
themselves to an additional risk without a rational anticipation of
higher expected returns.49  An investment in creation under the
lifetime-plus-years regime that fails to provide potential rational
authors with higher expected returns thus becomes less attractive
than a comparable investment under a fixed-term regime.
50
48. On the notion of financial risk as variability, see generally RICHARD A.
BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 143-60
(5th ed. 1996).
49. See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 46-49 (discussing expected
utility maximization and risk attitudes ); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (1983) (noting that in decisions
involving monetary outcomes economists assume that decision makers are risk
neutral or, at times, risk averse).
50. Even the presence of intermediaries who are able to tolerate greater
risks and would buy copyrights from authors would not fully compensate for
the inferiority of the lifetime-plus-years regime, as long as this regime fails to
provide higher returns on authorship given the increased risk it imposes.
Additionally, most authors-who tend to overestimate the present value of
their creations as we discuss infra Part Ill-will be unlikely to sell their
copyright to the more objective intermediaries, which would not share authors'
inflated estimates of the works' value. Regardless of behavioral differences
between authors and intermediaries, moreover, estimates of the value of not-
yet-existing creations frequently depend on "soft" information possessed only
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3. The incentives given by a lifetime-plus-years regime to authors
with non-average life expectancies are distorted
In addition to imposing a greater risk on all potential authors, the
lifetime-plus-years regime also provides distorted incentives to
create to authors with known non-average life expectancies. For
example, under the lifetime-plus-years regime, a younger-than-
average author will anticipate a longer-than-average period of
copyright protection and will therefore have a greater-than-average
incentive to create. An older-than-average author, on the other hand,
will face the opposite situation-anticipating a shorter-than-average
period of protection-and will consequently have a smaller-than-
average incentive to create.
51
More generally, the disparate incentives to create given to
authors of different life expectancies under the lifetime-plus-years
regime inevitably put many authors at an obvious advantage or
disadvantage as compared to the average author. This would be the
case for healthier-than-average versus less-healthy-than-average
authors, female versus male authors, or even authors of different
ethnicities, all of whom would be rationally aware of their
systematically different-from-average life expectancies.
Such systematic differences in copyright protection based on
arbitrary criteria would have been of lesser concern from the
perspective of providing the minimal necessary incentives to
create, 52 if even those potential authors with the shortest life
expectancy would still have sufficient incentives to create. If
smaller-than-average incentives to create are not always sufficient,
by the authors, who cannot convey it convincingly to the intermediaries. Cf
Tor, supra note 9, at 58-59 (discussing the comparable problem of divergent
expectations due to which entrepreneurs often find it difficult to sell their
innovations to incumbent firms in the industry).
51. Another, although not clearly pernicious, related effect occurs in the
case of joint authorship, where the copyright duration is determined based on
the longevity of the last surviving author, leading older authors to cooperate
with younger ones and providing them with a disincentive to cooperate with
other older, perhaps more accomplished authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(b).
52. Although systematic, arbitrary disparities between different potential
creators may legitimately raise distributive concerns.
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however, the lifetime-plus-years regime will systematically diminish
creation by certain classes of authors.53
The disparate effects of the lifetime-plus-years regime are likely
to cause the most harmful distortion in the case of younger- versus
older-than-average authors. This duration regime provides increased
incentives to newer and less-experienced authors, while providing
decreased incentives to their more mature and experienced
counterparts. It is nevertheless precisely these latter authors who
frequently produce the socially most valuable creations, as
commentators have long noticed.54 Apparently, therefore, the
lifetime-plus-years regime might be providing greater incentives for
the generation of those creations that are less valuable on average, at
the cost of diminishing the incentives-and with them the likelihood
of creation-for the generation of those creations that are more
valuable, on average, to society.
One might argue in favor of the disparate impact of the lifetime-
plus-years regime on authors of different ages that in some cases
younger authors need a greater incentive to create than older authors
do. This would be the case, for instance, if authors were to make a
long-term decision on whether to embark on a path of continued
creation rather than a case-by-case decision on whether to invest in a
particular creation. In such a setting, society might be better served
by encouraging younger authors to embark on the path of creation at
the expense of their older counterparts.
55
53. Moreover, insofar as creators with greater-than-optimal incentives to
create are likely to over-produce creations, society will bear an additional cost
in any case.
54. For a famous, eloquent argument regarding the relative advantage of
later as opposed to earlier creations of famous creators see, for example,
THOMAS B. MACAULAY'S, A Speech Delivered in a Committee of the House of
Commons on the 6h of April, 1842, in MACAULAY SPEECHES: A SELECTION
181 (N.Y. AMS Press 1979) ("That all the most valuable books of history, of
philology, of physical and metaphysical science, of divinity, of political
economy, have been produced by men of mature years, will hardly be
disputed."). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 156-79
(1995) (arguing that both the timing of the peak of creative activity and its
sustainability vary from one field to another).
55. This might also be the case if a lifetime of creation were to involve, for
example, a significant initial investment in fixed costs-for example, in
building knowledge and skill-with lower variable costs after the first creation.
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Nonetheless, this pro-distortion argument is both problematic
and limited in scope. The argument is problematic because young
authors with rational expectations will take into account their long-
term returns on investment in creation. They might be reasonably
reluctant to give up future incentives for present ones, especially if
they anticipate that their returns to creation will increase as they
advance in their career.56  In addition, the benefit of providing
greater incentives to younger authors-by-vocation comes at the cost
of providing smaller incentives to older creators who are not authors-
by-vocation. Think, for example, about books written by
professionals, executives, or businessmen. These are not authors-by-
vocation; when they write, they usually write a small number of
books at a relatively late stage in their career, after they acquire the
experience and wisdom that are pre-requisites for their authorship.
Their books may be of high social value; providing a smaller
incentive for their authorship is a social cost.
The argument in favor of disparate duration protection based on
life expectancy is also limited in scope, since most of the factors
associated with variations in life expectancy among potential authors
bear no relationship to the degree of incentives that the law should
provide these authors. Few would argue, for example, that healthier-
than-average authors need greater incentives than their less-healthy-
than-average counterparts, or that authors belonging to ethnic groups
with greater longevity require greater incentives than those belonging
to ethnicities that are statistically associated with shorter longevity.
4. The social costs of copyright under a lifetime-plus-years regime
A comparison of the social costs of the lifetime-plus-years
regime to the fixed-term alternative also fails to render the former
more attractive. The direct social costs of copyright monopoly under
the two regimes are similar: the former provides long-lived authors
with protection that is more costly than average and short-lived
authors with protection that is less costly than average. Nevertheless,
the aggregate monopoly costs of the variable protection given to
56. From a rational actor perspective, the need to discount the income from
further-in-the-future creations to a greater degree than the income expected
from near future ones, will temper this consideration, with the actual balance
of incentives depending on the period of creation, the distribution of expected
returns over time, and the discounting factor.
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authors under the lifetime-plus-years regime resemble the aggregate
invariable, average-based protection given to all authors under a
comparable fixed-term regime.
57
Similarly, the basic costs of administering any copyright regime,
as well as the costs of enforcing copyrights and litigating disputes
over them, do not seem to differ systematically between the two
competing regimes.
Tracing costs, however, may be even greater under the lifetime-
plus-years regime. Under a fixed-term regime, parties interested in
exploiting a work need only to know the date on which the copyright
begins in order to determine whether the work is still proprietary or
is already in the public domain. This datum-namely, the date of
creation-is readily available to the author, who also has an
incentive to disclose it in order to put the public on notice. 58 Since
such an action is nearly costless to the author and can be
accomplished by fixing this datum on the copyrighted work, for
example, it is likely to be undertaken.
Under a lifetime-plus-years regime, on the other hand, interested
parties need to know the author's date of the death. This datum is
non-existent at the time of creation, and often not even at
publication; it may be difficult and costly to obtain as well.
Moreover, the party with the information does not have an incentive
to disclose it to the public; a disclosure would simply put the
public-which is already on notice of the copyright's existence-on
notice of the limits of this right.59 Thus, under a lifetime-plus-years
regime, certain obstacles may either prevent the transfer of
information pertaining to copyrights' validity from the party owning
this information to the parties interested in obtaining it or inflate the
costs of this information transfer.
57. This conclusion-that the overall costs of an invariable average period
of protection equal those of a variable period of protection with the same
average-assumes the annual monopoly costs are normally (or equally)
distributed among the creations of long-lived and short-lived creators.
58. The law can also create mechanisms that induce authors to include such
a notice. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(2), (d) (2000) (allowing authors to
include the year of first publication in a notice, and granting such an action
evidentiary weight of notice). Note that the date of first publication is different
from the date of creation. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.08[A][1] (2002).
59. Moreover, in some cases even the copyright owner may not know the
author's date of death.
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On the other hand, one could argue that a lifetime-plus-years
regime might generate smaller tracing costs, as suggested by the
legislative history of the 1976 Act, because under this regime all of
an author's works pass into the public domain on the same date, even
for those authors who produce numerous creations.
60
Last, the additional social costs of copyright we enumerate
above-including the generation of excessive social investment in
authorship, the increased costs of cumulative authorship, and the
increased transaction costs during the sale or licensing of
copyrighted works-do not seem to differ substantially between the
two alternative regimes.
In sum, our evaluation of the lifetime-plus-years regime
suggests that it provides seemingly smaller incentives to create than a
comparable fixed-term regime due to the increased risk it imposes on
authors, while distorting the incentives given to authors with known
non-average life expectancies and possibly generating increased
tracing costs as compared to its fixed-term alternative.
III. THE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF A LIFETIME-PLUS-YEARS REGIME
A. The Inevitable Bounded Rationality of Individual Authors
A behavioral economic perspective emphasizes that copyright is
necessary to provide boundedly rational authors with incentives to
create under uncertainty. The copyright laws must be designed to
encourage authors to invest time, effort, and other resources in
generating new works whose economic value to them is based on an
uncertain stream of future income.
According to a traditional economic view, authors will invest in
creation only and always when they determine the net present value
of their potential works to be positive. 6 1 Our analysis in Part II has
also shown that authors making rational judgments of potential
60. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5750 ("All of a particular author's works, including
successive revisions of them, would fall into the public domain at the same
time, thus avoiding the present problems of determining a multitude of
publication dates and of distinguishing 'old' and 'new' matter in later
editions.").
61. See infra Part IV.A. for an explanation and application of the net
present value rule to potential authors' decisions.
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investments in creations and deciding rationally whether and how
much to create based on these judgments will prefer a fixed-term
regime to the extant lifetime-plus-years one.
Empirical evidence on the psychology of human judgment and
decision-making reveals, however, that potential authors-like other
individuals making judgments and decisions under uncertainty--do
not conform to the norms of rational action.62  Instead, a vast
literature documents how individuals are merely "boundedly
rational." Such real-life decision makers must employ simplifying
heuristics, which enable them to function reasonably well, but also
lead them to exhibit systematic predictable errors ofjudgment.
63
More specifically, the psychological evidence reveals two sets
of cognitive processes that are likely to cause potential authors to
overestimate the duration, and consequently the value, of copyrights
they obtain under a lifetime-plus-years regime. 64 These authors will
perceive the rationally inferior lifetime-plus-years regime as
providing them greater incentives to create than a seemingly superior
comparable fixed-term regime.
65
The first set of processes makes potential authors overoptimistic
regarding their longevity. Overoptimistic authors believe they will
live longer than the average author, and consequently overestimate
the length and value of the "lifetime" component in a lifetime-plus-
years regime. The second set of processes, on the other hand, leads
potential authors to overestimate the combined duration of a
"lifetime" plus "years" period, because the overall duration of
62. For instructive (and somewhat complementary) reviews of this
literature see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995); Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998).
63. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10, at 1124.
64. Creators will also be prone to overestimate the amount of income they
will receive in each future period. See supra text accompanying note 11.
Except insofar as this effect reinforces our present conclusions, however, it
does not bear directly on the choice of duration regimes; we therefore do not
discuss it in this article.
65. Importantly, the behavioral analysis in this Part is limited to a
comparison of these two regimes. The conclusion of this analysis regarding
the superior incentives provided by the lifetime-plus-years regime must be
tempered, however, by the general findings on the relatively limited effects of
far-future benefits on present decisions. See discussion infra Part IV.
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copyright under this rule is a function of two separate categories
(namely, a "lifetime" category and a "years" category). Because the
human mind categorizes information, a total copyright duration
broken into these two separate categories appears longer than a
comparable, single-category period of "years" under a fixed-term
regime, a phenomenon known as subadditivity.
66
B. Authors' Overestimates of their Longevity
Under the lifetime-plus-years regime, potential authors must
decide whether and how much to create while being faced with
significant uncertainty as to the duration of copyright protection their
works will ultimately enjoy. Unlike the known period they are
guaranteed under a fixed-term regime, the eventual duration and
value of their copyright will be a function of their uncertain
longevity.
A wealth of psychological data indicates, however, that authors
are highly likely to overestimate their longevity and thus the value of
copyright protection to them, exhibiting optimistic bias. 67 Hence, the
bounded rationality of authors leads them to treat the riskier prospect
of investment in creation under the lifetime-plus-years regime as
more, rather than less, attractive, in exact opposition to the attitude
rational actors would have exhibited.
Optimistic bias is likely to lead authors to overestimate their
longevity both directly and indirectly. Directly, because many
authors who contemplate their longevity will tend to think that they
are likely to live longer than average, exhibiting the same bias they
show when predicting their likelihood of succeeding in various tasks
or experiencing positive personal events.
68
66. See infra Part IV.C.
67. We will not review here the findings on optimistic bias in detail,
because they have been reviewed elsewhere in the legal literature. For a more
formal definition of optimistic bias and a detailed, systematic analysis of this
bias and related psychological processes see Tor, supra note 9 (manuscript at
24-33).
68. See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The
Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability,
57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082, 1089 (1989) (people overestimate
their academic skills, leadership ability, marriage prospects, and health); David
Dunning et al., Self-Serving Prototypes of Social Categories, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 957, 957-68 (1991) (showing how people
judge positive traits to be overwhelmingly more characteristic of themselves
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Importantly, however, authors are also likely to overestimate
their future longevity due to the indirect impact of their optimistic
bias regarding various factors that affect their life expectancy. They
will tend to overestimate their good health at the time of prediction;
in fact, even those authors who suffer significant illness will
frequently underestimate the severity of their condition and hold
unjustifiably optimistic views of their prognoses. 69 In addition to
holding a biased view of their present health condition, authors will
often deem themselves less vulnerable than they truly are to various
health- and other risks .70
Optimistic bias is therefore likely to cause biased assessments
and predictions of health and risks by individual authors,
compounding their direct optimistic bias regarding their life
expectancy prospects. This optimistic bias will frequently be
than negative attributes, and define personal attributes in idiosyncratic ways
that emphasize their perceived strengths); Marsha T. Gabriel et al., Narcissistic
Illusions in Self-Evaluations of Intelligence and Attractiveness, 62 J.
PERSONALITY 143, 153 (1994) (showing a specific linkage of narcissism to
self-illusion); Janet Metcalfe, Cognitive Optimism: Self-Deception or Memory-
Based Processing Heuristics?, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 100
(1998) (resembling positive illusions); Ola Svenson, Are We Less Risky and
More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146
(1981) (discussing the belief that some people tend to be more skillful and less
risky than others); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-
Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 193, 204 (1988) ("[t]he mentally healthy person appears to have the
enviable capacity to distort reality in a direction that... promotes an optimistic
view of the future."); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Positive
Illusions and Well-Being Revisited. Separating Fact From Fiction, 116
PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 22-23 (1994) (reviewing and discussing findings on
individuals' mildly distorted positive perceptions).
69. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Attributions, Beliefs About Control, and
Adjustment to Breast Cancer, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 489-
500 (1984) (breast cancer patients believing they have much greater control
over the course of their disease than medical findings warrant).
70. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein,
Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE. 1232 (1989); Neil D.
Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15
J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-6 (1996) (discussing findings showing that
people think themselves invulnerable to certain risks); see also Valerie A.
Clarke et al., Unrealistic Optimism and the Health Belief Model, 23 J. BEHAV.
MED. 367, 372-74 (2000) (healthy subjects exhibit bias in judgments of the
expected risk and severity of cancer, as well as the potential benefits and costs
they will experience in using screening methods).
460
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reinforced, moreover, by desirability biases and the illusion of
control.
Desirability biases occur when individuals predict future events
whose outcomes are important to them, making both laypersons and
experts prone to aligning their expectations with their preferences for
the outcomes of such events. 71 Unlike optimistic bias, desirability
biases affect judgments even where predictors know they cannot
affect outcomes.72 Authors exhibiting the desirability bias may thus
overestimate, for example, the likelihood that environmental
conditions affecting people's life expectancy will improve over their
lifetime, that new medications will be developed that will increase
longevity, or that various health risks are generally less pernicious
than they really are.
Last, the combined effects of optimistic bias and desirability
biases on authors' predictions of their future longevity will often be
reinforced by the illusion of control. This illusion-that is, the false
belief that one can control the outcomes of chance events-has been
documented extensively. 73  It contributes to life expectancy
optimistic bias by making authors prone to believe they would be
able to control the negative eventualities they deem unlikely if these
were to occur nonetheless.
74
71. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports
Fans, 2 Soc. BEHAV. 231 (1987); Elisha Babad & Yosi Katz, Wishful
Thinking-Against All Odds, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1921 (1991);
David Budescu & Meira Bruderman, The Relationship between the Illusion of
Control and the Desirability Bias, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109 (1995);
Donald Granberg & Edward Brent, When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-
Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1980, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 477, 477-79 (1983); Robert A. Olsen,
Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evidence
From Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 66-70 (1997); Roy M.
Poses, M.D. & Michele Anthony, M.D., Availability, Wishful Thinking, and
Physicians' Diagnostic Judgments for Patients with Suspected Bacteremia, 11
MED. DECISION MAKING 159 (1991) (reporting a similar "value bias").
72. See Tor, supra note 9 (manuscript at 27-28, 29-31) (drawing the
distinction between the effects of optimistic bias and desirability biases and
reviewing a number of additional, desirability-related phenomena).
73. See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975) (and the earlier studies cited therein); see also
Budescu & Bruderman, supra note 71, at 110 (citing additional, more recent
studies).
74. The illusion of control has been shown to both exert an independent
impact on judgment and to contribute to the effects of both optimistic bias and
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In sum, various processes are likely to lead authors to exhibit
inflated expectations of longevity. These biased predictions would
have provided authors no additional incentives to create under a
fixed-term duration regime. A lifetime-plus-years copyright regime,
however, allows potential authors' biased predictions of their
longevity to impact their estimates of the value of their future
copyrights, providing them with increased incentives to create.
Paradoxically, therefore, the same regime that would have decreased
the motivation of strictly rational potential authors to produce new
creations, increases the motivation of real-world boundedly rational
authors to create.
C. Subadditivity: The Effect of Splitting a Single Fixed Term into the
Two Categories of "Lifetime" and "Years ,75
Potential authors' optimistic bias regarding their future
longevity is not the only psychological process leading them to
overestimate the duration of the copyright they will obtain under the
lifetime-plus-years regime. Many studies of human judgment
suggest that a period of protection expressed as "lifetime" plus "x
years" will exert a greater impact on authors' decisions than a period
of a single term of years with an identical expected value.
7 6
Thus, in addition to authors' optimistic bias regarding the period
of copyright protection generated independently by the lifetime
component of the extant duration regime, the decomposition of a
longer term of years into two shorter distinctive categories of
"lifetime" and "years" is likely to bias potential authors' estimates of
this period even further.7 7 This characteristic of human judgment is
technically (and somewhat counterintuitively) known as
the desirability bias. At the same time, however, the empirical evidence shows
these latter phenomena also exist independently of the illusion of control. See
Tor, supra note 9 (manuscript at 32 nn. 127-28).
75. We use the terms "decomposing," "unpacking," "splitting," and
"breaking down" of events interchangeably, to signify the division of a broader
event into its components, since the varying technical meanings given to these
terms in the literatures we review are irrelevant for the present analysis.
76. That is, a fixed period of years whose duration is the mean life
expectancy of creators plus the "years" component of the lifetime-plus-years
rule.
77. Optimistic bias would thus influence choices between a lifetime-only
regime and a comparable fixed-term one, a case in which subadditivity would
be irrelevant.
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"subadditivity"-meaning that the whole is often judged smaller
than its parts when these are evaluated separately and then added
together.
In the following sections, we provide a first review in the legal
literature of the findings on this pervasive phenomenon. Because the
literature on subadditivity is fairly technical and complex, we discuss
it in some detail and highlight the differences between various
findings in this domain. We begin with the evidence on subadditive
judgments under uncertainty and risk-resembling the uncertain
"lifetime" component of the extant duration rule-and follow with
the findings on subadditivity in riskless judgment and choice-
resembling the "years" component of this rule. We then show how
pervasive and robust subadditivity is, although it is yet to be shown
in a setting that follows closely the case of the lifetime-plus-years
regime. This section concludes by presenting new evidence from a
focused experiment we ran that supports our specific application of
subadditivity to the question of alternative copyright duration
regimes.
1. Subadditive probability judgments under uncertainty and risk
79
The behavioral literature provides ample evidence of
subadditive judgments under uncertainty-where individuals judge
the likelihood of events whose probabilities are not known to them-
as when potential authors estimate the uncertain "lifetime"
component of their copyright duration under the lifetime-plus-years
regime. This evidence suggests that such judgments tend to be
subadditive because they are based on descriptions of events rather
than on direct evaluations of the judged events.
8 0
78. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory: A
Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability, 101 PSYCHOL. REv.
547, 548-50 (1994).
79. The decision-making literature commonly distinguishes between risky
decisions-where choices are made between different prospects with known
probabilities (such as lotteries)-and decisions and judgments under
uncertainty. The latter category refers to situations where the probability of
materialization of the possible outcomes is itself unknown (as is typically the
case in the real world). See, e.g., Dawes, supra note 62, at 530.
80. See, e.g., Tversky & Koehler, supra note 78, at 548. This fundamental
characteristic of probabilistic judgments is reflected in many behavioral
phenomena described by the "heuristics and biases" literature, well beyond
subadditivity. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
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One basic judgmental error that demonstrates the effects of
description on judgment is the conjunction fallacy. According to the
rules of probability theory (and simple logic), the probability of an
event that is a proper subset of another, broader class of events
cannot be greater than the probability of the class. Hence, an event
that is described by adding detail to the basic description of the class
should never be judged as more likely than the class as a whole.8 1 In
fact, findings that contradict this rule reflect the ultimate
subadditivity, showing how a single component, standing by itself,
can appear more likely than the less detailed, broader category to
which it belongs.
Many studies show, however, that people are prone to violate
this simple rule when the description attached to the smaller category
appears more compelling or relevant than the description attached to
the broader class. This effect is strongest when an event that initially
seems unlikely is supplemented by a qualifying description or a
plausible cause. For example, the occurrence of "a flood in North
America that drowns more than 1,000 people" seems initially
unlikely, but "an earthquake in California causing a flood that
drowns more than 1,000 people"-a mere subset of all the possible
scenarios for a North American flood killing 1,000 people-seems
more likely.
82
AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (a leading collection of earlier
articles on heuristics and biases); INTUITIVE JUDGMENT: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Tom Gilovich et al. eds., forthcoming) (a recent, up-to-date collection
of articles reviewing and presenting new findings in the heuristics and biases
tradition).
81. For a brief, basic exposition of probability theory see ROBYN M.
DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 275-92 (1988).
82. This phenomenon has been documented in numerous settings using
many different types of descriptions. For a short discussion see Tversky &
Koehler, supra note 78, at 561. On the conjunction fallacy more generally see
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:
The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293
(1983). Additional studies show, moreover, that the similar processes can
generate an "inclusion fallacy," where people judge a broad claim regarding a
superordinate category (e.g., "all bank tellers are conservative") as more
probable than a narrower claim regarding a subordinate category (e.g., "all
feminist bank tellers are conservative") that is logically less likely. See Eldar
B. Shafir et al., Typicality and Reasoning Fallacies, 18 MEMORY &
COGNITION 229 (1990) (studies I & 3 evidence the role of typicality, while
study 2 reports the inclusion fallacy).
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More generally, a large number of studies show how the
breaking down of a described event into its sub-components results
in higher average probability judgments for the components, taken
together, than for the overarching event. For instance, when
predicting the outcomes of a basketball match, the combined
probabilities assigned to the events "team A beats team B by at least
seven points" and "team A beats team B by less than seven points"
are greater than the probabilities assigned to the event "team A beats
team B," which is simply a combination of the two preceding
scenarios. 83 This effect has been documented in various contexts,
including predictions of economic events such as changes in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average over the next week, predictions of
temperatures, and predictions of the outcomes of national sporting
events, to name a few.
84
Furthermore, the subadditivity of probabilistic judgments is not
limited only to the division of events into their components along a
quantitative or numerical continuum. Subadditive judgments are
also prevalent in cases of categorical unpacking, where a
superordinate category (e.g., unnatural death) is broken into its more
basic sub-categories (e.g., car accidents, drowning, homicide, and
suicide).85
Many examples of how categorical unpacking causes
subadditivity come from decision tree studies.86 Different groupings
83. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and
Uncertainty, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 269 (1995) (explaining this and similar
findings by reference to prospect theory, where uncertainty is represented by a
weight function that satisfies bounded subadditivity).
84. E.g., id.; see also Craig R. Fox, Strength of Evidence, Judged
Probability, and Choice Under Uncertainty, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 167,
176-88 (1999) (replicating and extending these findings).
85. For an example on the higher informativeness and utility of natural or
"basic" categories in human perception and information processing see James
E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic Categories: Feature
Predictability and Information, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 291 (1992). See also
Gregory L. Murphy & Mary E. Lassaline, Hierarchical Structure in Concepts
and the Basic Level of Categorization, in KNOWLEDGE, CONCEPTS, AND
CATEGORIES 93 (Koen Lamberts & David Shanks eds., 1997) (reviewing
major findings on the role of basic categories).
86. "Decision trees" are schematic representations of relevant events with
their judged probability or value. They are used to assist decision makers in
identifying the sole or main cause of an undesired event ("fault trees"), the
multiple partial contributors to a problem ("influence trees"), or the value that
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of potential causes in a tree affect the probabilities decision makers
assign to these causes. For example, the mean probability assigned
to the residual "catch-all" category for determining a car's failure to
start practically doubled (from 22% to 44%) when its description as
"something other than the battery, the fuel system, or the engine"
was broken into its more specific components, such as "the starting
system" or "the ignition system."
87
A recent set of experiments further highlights how different
partitions of uncertain outcomes in legal cases can even bias
forecasts made by experienced lawyers of the partitioned outcomes'
probability .88 In the first of these studies, lawyers judged the likely
outcomes of the then undecided case of Jones v. Clinton, estimating
should be assigned to an outcome ("value tree"). E.g., J. Edward Russo &
Karen J. Kozlow, Where is the Fault in Fault Trees?, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 17 n. I (1994). Studies of
fault and influence trees are discussed here, because they involve probabilistic
judgments of external events, while findings in the context of value tree
analyses are discussed below, because they involve riskless judgments wherein
decision makers simply have to decide on the relative importance of the
attributes of alternative options for them.
87. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff et al., Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated
Failure Probabilities to Problem Representation, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 330 (1978) (showing also
that the effect appears for professionals as well, and therefore cannot be
attributed to decision makers' mere lack of knowledge). The subadditivity of
the residual category, which has also been termed a "pruning bias" (in
reference to the bias resulting from pruning the tree branches-the categories
of fault causes), has been replicated and shown in various other tasks. E.g.,
Russo & Kolzow, supra note 86, at 22-23 (causes of death). For other studies
finding a pruning bias in fault trees for various judgments, see Laurette Dub&
Rioux & J. Edward Russo, An Availability Bias in Professional Judgment, 1 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 223 (1988) (potential causes for a restaurant's
failure); Richard D. Rennie, Determination of Probable Cause by Auditors: A
Study of the Omission Effect in Fault Trees (1989) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Alberta, Canada) (a series of studies testing the bias
and its possible psychological causes), cited in Russo & Kozlow, supra this
note, at 17 (discrepancies in an account balance of a business firm); Tversky &
Koehler, supra note 78, at 551-53 (causes of death); Els C.M. van Schie &
Joop van der Plight, Getting an Anchor on Availability in Causal Judgment, 53
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 140 (1994) (examining influence
analysis, which is used to determine the relative importance of multiple
contributing factors, for estimating the multiple partial causes of acid rain).
88. See Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes:
Lawyers Assign Higher Probability to Possibilities That are Described in
Greater Detail, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 160 (2002).
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that the case would be resolved by judicial verdict as compared to
other possibilities. As predicted, although median "verdict"
estimates were similar regardless of how the other outcomes were
presented (20%), when the "non verdict" outcome category was
divided into four sub-categories (settlement, dismissal, immunity,
withdrawal), the lawyers' median predictions of these possible
outcomes exhibited dramatic subadditivity, increasing from 75% to
129%.89
The following experiments in this series yielded similar findings
using a quantitative partition of the amount of a damages award in an
auto accident tort case instead of a qualitative categorical partition
like the one used above; 90 a product partition where the outcome of a
child custody dispute was elaborated by adding a conjunction with a
second uncertain event;9 1 and an elaboration of the Supreme Court's
venue decision in the United States v. Microsoft appeal.92
Last, because unpacking inflates probabilistic judgments of
uncertain events, it also leads to biases in individuals' decisions,
affecting the relative attractiveness of alternative courses of action.
To illustrate, another experiment testing lawyers' predictions in the
series above found a strong effect of unpacking on the hypothetical
advice these lawyers would give to a junior colleague representing a
tort plaintiff.93 When the weaknesses of the plaintiffs case were
described as problems with "liability," 52% of the lawyers
recommended accepting a hypothetical settlement offer, but when
89. Thus leading to a total median probability of 149%, including the
"verdict" probability, in the latter case. See Fox & Birke, supra note 88, at
162-63 (study 1); see also id. at 166 (study 5) (providing evidence of
subadditive judgment due to categorical partitions in a within-subjects design).
90. See id. at 163-64 (study 2) (where the lawyers' median estimates of the
probability of the damages award being in one of four sub-categories summed
up to 178%).
91. See id. at 164 (study 3) (lawyers' median predictions of the likelihood
that the father will get custody were only 20%, while the sum estimates of his
getting both custody and the family home and his getting only custody but not
the home summed up to 30%).
92. See id. at 165 (study 4) (lawyers judged the probability of the
elaborated event that the case would "go directly to the Supreme Court and be
affirmed, reversed, or modified" as higher than the probability of the equal, but
unelaborated event, that the case would "go directly to the Supreme Court").
93. See id. at 166-67 (study 5).
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these weaknesses were described as problems with "duty, breach, or
causation," 74% of them recommended accepting the offer.
94
Taken together, these findings reveal that judgments of
uncertain events which are broken into smaller components, in
various settings, show significant subadditivity. They also indicate,
unsurprisingly, that decision makers' choice of behavior tends to
reflect the subadditivity of judgments under uncertainty as well. In
addition to the studies revealing subadditive judgments under
uncertainty, moreover, there is evidence that even risky judgments-
where the probabilities of the judged events are known to decision
makers-are subadditive as well.
Thus, one of the most robust empirical characteristics of human
decision-making is the tendency to overweight the importance of
small, known probabilities 95 (e.g., preferring a 0.5% chance of
winning $2,000 to a 1% chance of winning $1,000).96 Consequently,
a single event in a lottery (e.g., a 1% chance of winning $1,000) will
appear more attractive to decision makers when it is broken into two
components with an equal outcome but a smaller probability (e.g.,
two events, each with a 0.5% chance of winning $1,000), as
94. See id.
95. Importantly, the overweighting of small probabilities should be
distinguished from the common overweighting of unlikely events of an
unknown probability due to the well-known availability heuristic. Although in
reality the two phenomena often combine to bias choices concerning small
probability events, there is also evidence that people tend to underestimate
very low probability events of low availability. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 280 (1979) (noting the distinction between the estimation
of probabilities of uncertain events-which is subject to the availability
heuristic-and the later overweighting of small probabilities that are known or
already estimated during their transformation into decision weights-which
determine the impact of these probabilistic events on actual choices).
96. Formally, a subadditive probability weighting function across the whole
range of probabilities that are greater from zero (i.e., impossibility) and smaller
than one (i.e., certainty) results because, in addition to overweighting small
probabilities, people underweight uncertain events as compared to certain ones,
and exhibit subproportionality-the finding that for any fixed ratio of
probabilities, the ratio of decision weights is closer to unity when the
probabilities are lower than when they are high. See, e.g., id. at 280-84; see
also Drazen Prelec, The Probability Weighting Function, 66 ECONOMETRICA
497 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect
Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
297 (1992) (further developments in modeling the weighting function).
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evidenced by recent studies on "event-splitting effects" that violate
expected utility norms.97  Recently, scholars studying these latter
effects have shown that decision makers may even have a
fundamental preference for alternatives offering a larger number of
positive outcomes over those offering fewer such outcomes.
98
In the case of the lifetime-plus-years regime, however, only the
"lifetime" component of the duration rule is uncertain (or risky) since
potential authors do not know in advance their ultimate longevity
with certainty. The "years" component of this duration rule, on the
other hand, is certain, and therefore might not be subject to the same
impact of subadditivity as is the uncertain (or risky) lifetime
component. The following section therefore presents evidence for
subadditive decision-making in situations that more closely resemble
the years component, where decisions are riskless-requiring
decision makers only to express their preference and attitudes.
97. See, e.g., Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, Testing for Juxtaposition and
Event-Splitting Effects, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235 (1993) (early
development of the notion of event-splitting effects).
98. See Steven J. Humphrey, More Mixed Results on Boundary Effects, 61
ECON. LETTERS 79, 81-82 (1998) (offering two models for interpreting event-
splitting effects as preferences over numbers of outcomes, positive and
negative compared to a reference point); Steven J. Humphrey, Probability
Learning. Event-Splitting Effects and the Economic Theory of Choice, 46
THEORY & DECISION 51, 71-73 (1999) [hereinafter Humphrey, Probability
Learning] (discussing the possible reasons for these effects, reporting
experimental tests, and concluding that the frequency of outcome plays a role
in decision-making but generally does not outweigh the influence of outcome
probability enough to lead decision makers to prefer lower expected value
(stochastically dominated) options on average); Steven J. Humphrey, The
Common Consequence Effect: Testing a Unified Explanation of Recent Mixed
Evidence, 41 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 239 (2000) (offering further evidence
for the role of outcome frequency in choice, although not as a sole
determinative factor); Steven J. Humphrey, Are Event-Splitting Effects
Actually Boundary Effects?, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 79 (2001) [hereinafter
Humphrey, Boundary Effects] (providing evidence that event-splitting effects
are not driven by the frequency of zero outcomes but, rather, by a preference
for more positive and fewer negative outcomes); see also, William S. Neilson,
Some Mixed Results on Boundary Effects, 39 ECON. LETTERS 275 (1992)
(reviewing findings showing that when alternative risky gambles involve the
same number of outcomes, frequently observed expected utility violations
diminish).
Fall 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:437
2. Subadditivity in riskless decision-making
Studies examining riskless decisions-where individuals make
judgments and choices of events whose outcomes are certain-
provide evidence that mirror the findings on the impact of splitting
events in uncertain and risky decisions. These studies reveal the
already familiar pattern, where the breaking down of events or
categories into smaller components increases their overall perceived
attractiveness.
For instance, one series of studies examined people's estimates
and preferences regarding alternative energy sources for UK
electricity. 99 Strikingly, participants making judgments concerning
nuclear energy versus other sources rated nuclear energy as
significantly less attractive when the "other sources" category was
broken down into more specific components, such as oil, coal, or
hydro. This result is especially surprising because attractiveness
ratings are supposed to reflect preferences, requiring no probabilistic
(or other) inferences about states of the world. These participants
were not required to make estimates about external events, but
merely to describe what they would like to see happen.
00
Similar findings have been observed in studies of "multiattribute
utility measurement," wherein participants evaluated, for example,
alternative future jobs differing on a number of attributes, including
job security, income, and career opportunities. Researchers
manipulating the degree of detail in attribute descriptions found that
an increase in detail increased the overall weight of the particular
99. See Joop van der Plight et al., Comparative Judgments and Preferences:
The Influence of the Number of Response Alternatives, 26 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 269, 273-75 (1987) (experiment 2).
100. Interestingly, moreover, the effect of category breakdown on preference
ratings was significantly stronger than its impact on percentage responses
(although the latter judgments were biased significantly as well), suggesting
that expressions of preference may be even more malleable to this
manipulation than probabilistic judgments, and therefore that these findings
also indicate the effects cannot be attributed only to a lack of information about
alternative sources. The other experiments in this study yielded similar results,
with the same participants giving higher ratings to energy sources presented
alone than when presented with other sources on an earlier occasion. This
suggests that a lack of information alone cannot explain the findings
(experiment 1, at 271-73), and shows a similar effect in a design that controlled
the potential effect of estimates on preferences by having participants express
preferences first and make estimates later (experiment 3, 276-78). See id.
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attribute (e.g., job security) in the participants' judgments, and
correspondingly decreased the weights of the other attributes (i.e.,
income and career opportunities) in the job choice decision.
10 1
In fact, subadditivity has also been found in the form of a "part-
whole" bias in individuals' riskless valuations of consumer goods.
10 2
Studies of this bias show that research participants exhibit an
implicitly higher valuation for a commodity when it is broken into its
components. 10 3  Using an experimental market where participants
traded local restaurant vouchers, these researchers found that both
the willingness to pay and the willingness of participants to accept
were significantly lower for a voucher for a full meal than for
separate vouchers for individual courses. 1
04
An increase in the number of judged categories, attributes, or
events not only increases their perceived weight, attractiveness, and
valuation, but also inflates perceptions of numbers, quantities, and
frequencies. Thus, scholars have identified a "numerosity heuristic,"
where decision makers sometimes use the number of units into which
a stimulus is divided as a proxy for judging amount or likelihood.0 5
As is the case with other decision heuristics, numerosity often
provides a useful proxy for amount, since the two variables are
frequently correlated. 0 6 For example, a larger number of food units
101. See Martin Weber et al., The Effects of Splitting Attributes on
Multiattribute Utility Measurement, 34 MGMT. SCI. 431, 437-41 (1988); see
also Mary Poyhonen et al., Behavioral and Procedural Consequences of
Structural Variation in Value Trees, 134 EUR. J. OPERATIONS RES. 216 (2001)
(showing that the division of attributes biases their weighting for individual
participants, as well as for the mean judgments across participants).
102. This bias was originally found in studies using contingent valuation-a
common method for evaluating environmental public goods, where scholars
have given it Various explanations other than subadditivity, and only later
replicated for trades of consumer goods. See, e.g., Kevin J. Boyle et al., An
Investigation of Part-fWhole Biases in Contingent- Valuation Studies, 27 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 64, 69-70 (1994) (finding no statistically significant
difference in the willingness to pay of independent samples of nonusers to
prevent two thousand, twenty thousand, or two hundred thousand migratory
waterfowl deaths, and examining different explanations for this phenomenon).
103. See Ian Bateman et al., Does Part-Whole Bias Exist? An Experimental
Investigation, 107 ECON. J. 322 (1997).
104. See id. at 327-31 (using a design that controlled for wealth effects,
strategic choices, and other confounding variables).
105. Brett W. Pelham et al., The Easy Path from Many to Much: The
Numerosity Heuristic, 26 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 103 (1994).
106. See id. at 105.
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typically indicates the presence of a larger amount of food in the
natural environment, 10 7 and an eight-room house is typically larger
than a five-room house (although contrary cases clearly exist as
well).'0 8
Thus, experiments using a variety of judgment tasks have shown
that numerosity can cause subadditivity effects in visual judgments
of the area of a circle that was divided into many separate pieces; in
solving addition problems containing more elements while being
cognitively taxed by another task; in rapid estimates of the total
monetary value of American coin arrays; in hypothetical choices of a
course of action with more positive outcomes and fewer negative
ones, even when preferred choices were normatively less attractive;
and in global judgments of a person (e.g., "compared to the average
person, how talented is Tom?") based on lists of nine identical
descriptive traits, when these nine traits were listed one by one as
opposed to being divided into three groups only. 1
09
In sum, the findings on riskless decision-making show that
people exhibit significant subadditivity even in settings where no
uncertainty or risk are involved. These latter situations closely
resemble the "years" component of the lifetime-plus-years duration
regime. Apparently, even in the absence of any risk, authors are
likely to overweight the combination of different, shorter periods of
copyright protection as compared to a single period of equal
objective length.
107. See id. at 103-04 (reviewing evidence of a numerosity effect in
divisions of food reinforcements in animal studies).
108. See id. at 105.
109. See id. at 109-25 (experiments 1-5). For related findings on the effects
of category splitting on frequency estimates in judgment and memory see
Robert F. Belli et al., Decomposition Can Harm the Accuracy of Behavioral
Frequency Reports, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295, 296-300 (2000)
(decomposition of categories in survey questions leads to over-reporting of
past events); Klaus Fielder & Thomas Armbuster, Two Halfs [sic] May Be
More Than One Whole: Category-Split Effects on Frequency Illusions, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 633 (1994) (showing evidence and examining
the causes of increases in the subjective frequency on splitting of event
categories); Matthew Mulford & Robyn M. Dawes, Subadditivity in Memory
for Personal Events, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 47 (1999) (showing that subadditive
judgments exist, not only for external events, but also for memories of personal
events, depending on the level of specificity with which questions are asked).
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3. The pervasiveness and robustness of subadditivity
The psychological literature reveals that subadditivity is a
widespread characteristic of human judgment and choice. We have
shown that the splitting of categories, events, or outcomes biases
both judgment and choice under risk and uncertainty alike." °
Moreover, even expressions of preference and riskless judgments of
events, amounts, and quantities exhibit subadditivity.
Additionally, behavioral studies from the last decade show that
subadditivity is more pervasive than previously thought, affecting
judgments that were previously believed immune from this decision
error. For instance, the studies that established the existence of
subadditivity have shown it occurs when an event is broken into its
mutually exclusive and exhaustive components. In this setting,
subadditivity means that the sum of the separately evaluated
components-which objectively equal the original event-is greater
than the original event."l' Recent studies nonetheless show that the
effects of partitioning uncertain events on judgment may be strong
enough so that even the sum of non-exhaustive components-which
objectively comprise only a subset of the broader category-may be
greater than the overarching category.
To illustrate, basketball fans predicting the outcomes of the 1996
NBA playoffs exhibited significant subadditivity when judging the
odds that one of four leading teams in one conference (Chicago,
Orlando, Indiana, and New York) would win the playoffs as
110. In fact, the subadditivity under uncertainty is typically even greater than
under risk, since the impact of the psychological factors that bias the latter-
when probabilities are known-are compounded by the fact that probabilities
are not clearly quantified under uncertainty. See, e.g., Tversky & Fox, supra
note 83, at 278-79 (finding, in a variety of tasks, that probability judgments
exhibit a smaller degree of subadditivity as compared to decision weights,
which supports a two-stage model for judgment under uncertainty that begins
with a probability assessment and is then transformed by a risky weighting
function); see also Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, A Belief-Based Account of
Decision Under Uncertainty, 44 MGMT. SCI. 879 (1998) [hereinafter Fox &
Tversky, A Belief-Based Account] (developing a more detailed account of this
two-stage model and providing further evidence for its predictive power).
111. See, e.g., Russo & Kozlow, supra note 86, at 17 (describing the pruning
bias and stating, "[t]he only legitimate difference between the branch
probabilities of the full and pruned trees is that the probabilities of the three
branches cut from the full tree should be completely transferred to the pruned
tree's catchall category, 'All Other Problems."').
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compared to other fans judging the odds that the winner would be
from that conference (i.e., the Eastern conference). Since each
conference included eight teams that qualified for the playoffs,
however, the odds of the four leading teams in each conference were
judged by participants to be greater than a broader category
containing eight teams, of which they were only a subset.
112
Similar findings have been observed in the domain of choice as
well. In one study, for instance, participants were willing to pay
higher dollar amounts for a health insurance policy covering
hospitalization for the subset category of "all diseases and accidents"
than they were willing to pay for a broader policy covering
hospitalization for "any reason."
' 113
112. See Fox & Tversky, A Belief-Based Account, supra note 110, at 886.
Recent findings on violations of "binary complementarity" provide another
example of the pervasiveness of subadditivity. Binary complementarity is the
finding that when people are asked about two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive events (that is, when they are presented with explicit disjunctions),
their subjective probability judgments are typically additive, summing to about
100%. E.g., Tversky & Koehler, supra note 78, at 549. Recent studies
suggest, however, that under various circumstances, even such straightforward
judgments show subadditivity. See, e.g., Peter Ayton, How to be Incoherent
and Seductive: Bookmakers' Odds and Support Theory, 72 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 99, 107-12 (1997) (presenting evidence of non-
complementarity of explicit disjunctions in horse-race betting, discussing these
findings, and reviewing other studies to this effect); Paul D. Windschitl, The
Binary Additivity of Subjective Probability Does Not Indicate the Binary
Complementarity of Perceived Certainty, 81 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN
DECISION PROCESSES 195 (2000) (presenting evidence of non-
complementarity even in the presence of superficially additive probability
judgments of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events). See also Lorraine
Chen Idson & David H. Krantz, The Relation Between Probability and
Evidence Judgment: An Extension of Support Theory, 22 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 227 (2001) (presenting a model that accounts for non-additivity
even in binary partitions); Derek J. Koehler et al., The Enhancement Effect in
Probability Judgment, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 293 (1997) (showing
how the judged probability of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
hypotheses increases with the degree to which the evidence is compatible with
these hypotheses, and explaining how it is consistent with support theory);
Kimihiko Yamagishi, Proximity, Compatibility, and Noncomplementarity in
Subjective Probability, 87 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 136
(2002) (presenting evidence and an explanation for binary
noncomplementarity).
113. J. E. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993). Moreover, subadditivity for
component events that are only a subset of the composite event has been found
INCENTIVES TO CREATE
The processes of subadditivity are also robust enough to impact
decisions when decision makers-in both experimental and real
world settings-have clear financial incentives to make accurate
probability judgments. For example, in another study testing NBA
playoff outcome predictions, subjects were told that some
participants would be selected at random to play one of the choices
they made hypothetically in the experiment and could win up to
$160.1 14 These subjects still made subadditive judgments."
15
One study examining subadditivity in judgments of the
likelihood of various causes of death in the United States controlled
directly for the effect of monetary incentives on performance. The
researchers informed half of the sixty participants in each
experimental condition that the five subjects making the most
accurate judgments (i.e. 1/6 of them) would receive an additional
payment of $20 each. 1 6 A comparison of the performance of the
two groups-those who received versus those who did not receive
monetary incentives for accurate performance-revealed that the
participants in both groups exhibited statistically significant but
indistinguishable levels of subadditivity in their judgments, showing
that the added incentives for accuracy caused no reduction in the
impact of subadditivity on judgments."
7
Even more strikingly, gamblers in fixed odds betting markets for
soccer and horse racing in England appear to exhibit a costly,
systematic, and pronounced subadditivity as well." 8 The published
even for memory of personal events. See Mathew Mulford & Robyn M.
Dawes, Subadditivity in Memory for Personal Events, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 47
(1999).
114. See Fox & Tversky, A Belief-Based Account, supra note 110, at 882-87
(study 1). Monetary incentives for performance were also used in the various
event-splitting studies by Humphrey. See Humphrey, supra note 98, at 80.
115. See Fox & Tversky, A Belief-Based Account, supra note 110, 8 82-87
(study 1).
116. See Tversky & Koheler, supra note 78, at 551 (study 1).
117. See id. at 552. In another experiment in the same series, the researchers
provided a similarly structured incentive to all participants. These participants
still showed significant subadditivity in judgments of the percentage of U.S.
married couples with a given number of children. See id. at 553 (study 2).
118. In these markets, bookmakers advertise the odds in the form on an odd
ratio x-y (e.g., 4-6), which translates to a probability of lOOy/(x+y) for the
bettor (i.e., 60%). Hence, if y occurs, the bettor gets back y (i.e., six) plus a
winning of x (i.e., four). See Ayton, supra note 112, at 101-03 (explaining the
characteristics of this betting form in greater detail).
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betting odds for soccer matches are typically subadditive: the odds
for an outcome of one team (e.g., England) winning over another
(e.g., Switzerland) are lower than the sum of the odds for the
gambles on the smaller sub-events of that team (i.e., England)
leading for the first half then winning, trailing the first half then
winning, and having a first half draw followed by a win.119
Horse race betting odds show a similar pattern. An analysis of
the published odds for a randomly selected list of forty races has
revealed a clear relationship between the number of horses in the
race and the sum probability of the bets. In all the races, moreover,
the probabilities summed to more than 100%.12 0  This increasing
subadditivity is apparently no bar to bettors, however, who continue
betting on larger horse races and more specific scenarios of soccer
match outcomes although they are offered consistently worse returns
for betting in these settings.
4. Subadditivity and the psychological effect of a "lifetime-plus-
years" copyright duration
Our review of the evidence of subadditivity has shown its
pervasiveness in diverse domains, biasing human behavior in a
variety of judgment and decision-making tasks. As might be
expected, researchers identifying these phenomena have proposed a
number of different psychological mechanisms that may underlie
them. 122 However, regardless of the various specific explanations,
some general patterns emerge from the evidence on subadditivity.
119. See id. at 104-06.
120. See id. at 107-08. These findings are quite striking since it should be
obvious to all gamblers that only a single horse will win the race (and the
probability of all bets together can therefore be no greater than one).
121. See id. at 113.
122. E.g., Fielder & Armbuster, supra note 109, at 634-36 (loss of
information during categorization); Humphrey, Probability Learning, supra
note 98, at 52-53 (categorical memory for frequency); Derek J. Koehler,
Probability Judgment in Three-Category Classification Learning, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 28, 29-31
(2000) (the compatibility of the evidence with competing hypothesis); Pelham,
supra note 105, at 103-07 (number of stimuli); Tversky & Koehler, supra note
78, at 549 (the support of evidence based on availability, memory, and
attention); Yamagishi, supra note 112, at 136 (similarity); see also Daniel
Read, Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 10 (2001) (suggesting that the statistical phenomenon of
regression to the mean, which biases estimates under risk and uncertainty
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First, the effect of splitting events may appear even when the
sub-events are similar, as when they belong to the same qualitative
category, but is more pronounced when the sub-events appear more
distinctive from one another. 123 This should not come as a surprise,
since the literature on human (and animal) cognition shows that
categorization is fundamentally important and quite effective for the
processing of information about the environment, 12 4 but also leads to
inevitable perceptual and judgmental errors. For example, people
find stimuli of the same perceptual category to resemble one another
more than they do on an objective scale, while showing the opposite
tendency for stimuli belonging to different perceptual categories.
1 25
The division of events into smaller components should therefore be
reasonably expected to induce a greater degree of subadditivity when
towards the mean, may also have a role in subadditive judgments because it
generates overestimates of small quantities and underestimates of large ones).
123. Compare Pelham, supra note 105 (discussing evidence on the
numerosity heuristic, a case where divisions merely create "more of the
same"), with Fischoff et al., supra note 87; Dubd-Rioux & Russo, supra note
87; Rennie, supra note 84; Russo & Kolzow, supra note 86, at 22-23; Tversky
& Koehler, supra note 78, at 551-53; van Schie & van der Plight, supra note
87 (discussing the findings on fault tree biases when events are divided into
distinct sub-categories).
124. See, e.g., James E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic
Categories: Feature Predictability and Information, 11 PSYCHOL. BULL. 291
(1992). In this article, Corter and Gluck explain:
Categorization is one of the most basic cognitive functions. Why is the
ability to categorize events or objects important to an organism? An
obvious answer to this question is that categories are important
because they often have functional significance for the organism.
Another familiar answer is that grouping objects into categories allows
for efficient storage of information about these groups of objects.
Id. at 291; see also David J. Freedman et al., Categorical Representation of
Visual Stimuli in the Primate Prefrontal Cortex, 291 SCIENCE 312, 312 (2001)
("Categorization is fundamental; our raw perceptions would be useless without
our classification of items .... ).
125. See, e.g., Joachim Krueger & Russell W. Clement, Memory-Based
Judgments About Multiple Categories: A Revision and Extension of Tajfel's
Accentuation Theory, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (1994)
(reviewing the findings on providing additional evidence on these effects of
categorization); see also Klaus Fielder, Explaining and Simulating Judgment
Biases as an Aggregation Phenomenon in Probabilistic, Multiple-Cue
Environments, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 193 (1996) (suggesting that many
judgmental biases result from processes of categorization in uncertain
environments, and reviewing relevant evidence).
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the divided components belong to qualitatively different categories-
appearing more different from one another. 1
26
Second, many studies suggest that the number of components
into which an event is split has a significant impact on the degree of
subadditivity observed, regardless of other contributing cognitive
mechanisms. 127  This again follows from the usefulness of
numerosity as a proxy for estimating quantity and frequency. 128 An
increase in the number of components, moreover, tends to increase
the difficulty of the judgmental task, making the integration of the
information provided by the different components more complicated.
This additional complexity, in turn, leads boundedly rational actors
to rely on mental heuristics more than they would when faced with a
less complex task, fostering a higher degree of subadditivity.129
These conclusions indicate that potential authors will be prone
to perceive the lifetime-plus-years regime as providing them with
greater incentives to create than a comparable fixed-term duration of
copyright protection. The anticipated duration of their copyright
under the latter is manifested in a single category of years. The
extant regime, on the other hand, unpacks the description of
copyright duration into two separate and very distinct categories-a
category of lifetime and a category of years.
The integration of these two categories with one another is
unlikely, since they do not use the same measurement metric. This
difference between the two categories is not merely superficial. The
126. Cf Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Unpacking, Repacking, and
Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory, 104 PSYCHOL. REv. 406 (1997)
(discussing the finding that people tend to "repack" separate components to a
greater degree-and therefore show less subadditivity-when these
components are more similar to one another).
127. See, e.g., Ayton, supra note 112, at 107-08 (horse race betting); Fox &
Tversky, A Belief-Based Account, supra note 110, at 883-84 (in judgments of
NBA playoff outcomes); Humphrey, Boundary Effects, supra note 98, at 90 (in
monetary gambles); Pelham et al., supra note 105, at 107-09 (in various
judgmental tasks); Weber et al., supra note 101, at 439 (in multiattribute utility
measurement).
128. See Pelham et al., supra note 105, at 105.
129. Cf id. at 109 (proposing "that the degree to which people... [will
overinfer quantity from numerosity will depend, in large part, on the degree to
which] ... their higher-order cognitive resources .... [are taxed at the time
they render their judgments]" and showing the effect of cognitive difficulty on
participants' reliance on the numerosity heuristic in a number of tasks).
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lifetime category is qualitative and uncertain or risky (probabilistic),
while the years category is quantitative and fixed.
Apparently, the lifetime-plus-years regime uses the bounded
rationality of authors, relying on the combined impact of their
optimistic bias regarding their future longevity and the subadditivity
of their estimates of a copyright duration comprised of two
cognitively distinct periods. 3 ° Exploiting these two robust biases,
the lifetime-plus-years regime provides authors with greater
incentives to create than a comparable fixed-term duration would
have provided them. It accomplishes this result, however, by
possibly generating greater tracing costs13 1 and distorting the relative
incentives to create given to some classes of authors.
132
The behavioral analysis of the lifetime-plus-years regime
therefore reveals its superior incentive-providing capacity.
Nevertheless, the present findings do not prove conclusively that this
regime is a more efficient means of providing incentives to
individual authors all considered, although this may be the case. It is
possible, for instance, that the possibly increased tracing costs and
distortion of incentives to authors with known non-average life
expectancies are large enough to overcome whatever increased
incentives to create the lifetime-plus-years of copyright duration
provides all authors. A final determination of this question,
however, would have to await a more precise calibration of both the
130. Ironically, the strong effect of these two behavioral phenomena may be
somewhat tampered if the discounting of future benefits is also subject to
subadditivity. If this is the case, the breaking of a fixed term into smaller
components would result in a greater discount for the components taken
together than for the single fixed term. One recent study suggests as much, at
least for short term discounting, finding that participants exhibit higher
discounting rates in choices between smaller future benefits and larger present
ones when an overall two-year period is broken into three eight-month
components. See Read, supra note 122, at 19-21. However, the evidence for
this type of subadditivity is limited, and appears to contradict many robust
findings regarding choice over time. See Shane Frederick et al., Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, J. ECON. LITERATURE
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16-17, on file with authors). Furthermore, the
focused tests we describe herein show a strong positive impact of subadditivity
on preferences under a lifetime-plus-years regime, despite the possible
contradictory effect of time discounting subadditivity. See discussion infra
Part III.D.
131. See supra Part II.B.4.
132. See supra Part II.B.3.
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economic costs of the two regimes and the magnitude of the
incentivizing impact they generate.
D. Experimental Tests of the Lifetime-Plus-Years Effect
To further buttress our application of the empirical behavioral
evidence, we conducted a focused experiment, which we report in
detail elsewhere as part of a larger study. 133 Our findings show, as
we hypothesized based on the preceding analysis, that decision
makers find a lifetime-plus-years stream of payments significantly
more attractive than a stream lasting for a comparable fixed-term
period. We also find that the effects of optimistic bias and
subadditivity are independent of one another, and are each
responsible for a distinctive additional increase in participants'
favorably biased perceptions of a lifetime-plus-years duration.
Participants in our study rated how attractive they found two
alternative streams of future payments, assuming the life expectancy
for individuals of their sex and age were to live another forty-five
years. 134 As expected, a significant proportion of the participants
showed optimistic bias regarding their own longevity. More than
one-third of these participants found a lifetime-based payment-
which could be either shorter or longer than forty-five years
depending on their actual longevity-more attractive than the safer
option of definitely receiving a stream of profits for forty-five years.
This finding contradicts the traditional economic prediction that
rational actors will always prefer a safer option to a riskier one when
both provide the same expected returns.1
35
Participants' choices also revealed very strong subadditivity.
When rating the attractiveness of an alternative under which they and
their heirs would receive a fixed stream of income for ninety-five
years as compared to receiving this stream for their lifetime plus fifty
years after their death, the overwhelming majority of participants
133. See Tor & Oliar, supra note 1.
134. This assumption was reasonable for these participants, who were
graduate and undergraduate students at Boston-area universities and colleges.
135. Importantly, the experiment also controlled for the possibility that these
participants had a much greater preference for payments to themselves as
compared to payments to their heirs after their death. Such a preference, if
present and strong enough, could lead even non-optimistic, risk-averse
participants to prefer a lifetime benefit to a fixed-term one. See Tor & Oliar,
supra note 1; see also discussion supra note 7.
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preferred the risky alternative, and only 14% opted for the
economically sound, risk-free payment.
Thus, the addition of a fixed period of fifty years to both
payment alternatives in the basic choice task (of lifetime versus
forty-five years) caused a dramatic increase in participants'
preference for the riskier, lifetime-plus-years alternative. We cannot
attribute this pattern to optimistic bias since the added period was
fixed and unrelated to longevity. This pattern is, however, precisely
the subadditive pattern predicted from breaking a single "ninety-five
years" period into two separate periods belonging to distinctive
categories of "lifetime" on the one hand, and "fifty years" on the
other.
IV. EXTENDING FAR-FUTURE BENEFITS TO INFLUENCE PRESENT
DECISIONS: THE LIMITS OF THE LIFETIME-PLUS-YEARS EFFECT
The CTEA has extended copyright duration given to individual
authors by twenty years, from lifetime plus fifty years to lifetime
plus seventy years. We therefore examine in this Part whether this
change is likely to provide significant marginal incentives to create
beyond those already in existence under the pre-CTEA regime. First,
we discuss the proportionally small present economic value of far-
future income. Second, we describe the evidence on the limited
behavioral impact of far-future events on present decisions. Third
and finally, drawing on our analysis in Part III, we show that those
behavioral factors responsible for the basic impact of the lifetime-
plus-years regime are absent from the CTEA's extension. We thus
conclude that the prospective extension has only a negligible impact
on potential authors, and support this conclusion with a focused
experiment we conducted.
A. The Economics of Far-Future Benefits
The CTEA's prospective twenty-year extension impacts the
returns to individual authors beginning fifty years after their death.
The economic theory of finance provides a simple and clear
normative rule for determining the current value of this added future
stream of potential income-the net present value (NPV) 
rule.136
136. See, e.g., BREALY & MYERS, supra note 48, at 11-28, 85-108
(discussing net present value and the opportunity cost of capital).
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According to the NPV rule, one should invest in a project, such
as a new work, only if the present value (PV) of the future income
from that project (net of the costs that must be invested in the
project) is positive. 137  To determine the present value of future
income one must take into account the time-value of money, which
in the case of risk-free investments is typically the interest rate. 138
Assuming an annual interest rate r of 5%, for example, $1.00 today
has a future value of $1.05 a year from today. The reverse arithmetic
is used for determining the present value of $1.00 a year from today,
which given the same 5% interest rate is approximately $0.95
(1/1.05).
We can apply the same principle to determine the present value
of any monetary sum expected to be earned at any period in the
future. However, because the interest rate is annual, one must
calculate the accumulated discount rate for the period under
consideration. This discount function takes an exponential form,
such that $1.00 received n years in the future has a present value of
1/(l+r)n.139 Hence, the present value of $1.00 that will be received
fifty years from today, for instance, is 1/(1. 0 5 )50 = $0.09.
Using the PV calculus we find that the per-dollar value of the
twenty-year extension provided by the CTEA is very small, due to
the exponential nature of the discount function, with its specific
extent depending on the rate of interest and the author's longevity.
For example, for r of 5%, the total value of a stream of one-dollar
annual payments is $19.48 for the first seventy-five years from today
(representing a lifetime of twenty-five years after creation plus the
additional fifty years of copyright under the 1976 Act), but only
137. See BREALY & MYERS, supra note 48. in fact, the rule requires NPV
maximization, meaning that the investment has to provide the author with the
highest NPV of all investments available, after discounting the various present
values to account for the risks these investments involve. Therefore, estimates
of the extension's effect on potential authors obtained without taking into
account alternative investments overstate the extension's impact.
138. PV calculations based on the interest rate for risk-free investment are
highly conservative, overstating the value of the extension to creators. Most
potential authors face a great degree of uncertainty regarding the far-future
returns on creation beginning more than fifty years after the investment in
creation. To calculate NPV properly, one must discount the expected return
sufficiently to compensate for the risk involved, resulting in substantially
smaller present values.
139. See id. at 12-13.
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$0.33 for the additional twenty years provided by the CTEA's
extension (a present value increase of less than 2%).
Furthermore, as the rate of interest increases, the present value
of future income diminishes. 140 Similarly, the longer an author lives,
the further is the future the date at which the extension's benefit will
begin accruing, and the smaller the present value of the extension to
the author.
141
In sum, the economic theory of financial decision-making uses
an exponential discount function to determine the present value of
future income. The basic characteristics of this function indicate that
the additional income resulting from the CTEA's extension amounts
to but a very small proportion of the present value of the lifetime
plus fifty years of income to which potential authors have already
been entitled under the 1976 Act. A minor incremental benefit of
this kind, therefore, provides but minute marginal incentive to
potential rational authors. 1
42
B. The Psychology of Far-Future Benefits
The CTEA's extension provides rational potential authors with
small additional objective economic incentives to invest in creation.
Because actual authors are only boundedly rational, however, we
must examine how these real-life actors are likely to perceive the
extension subjectively. Could it be, for example, that boundedly
rational authors perceive this extension as more beneficial to them
140. Thus, while the PV of the extension for every one-dollar paid annually
throughout the extension's term, assuming r = 5% is $0.33, the PV of the
extension assuming r = 7% is only $0.06 for the same twenty-year period.
141. For example, assuming r = 5%, the total PV of the extension to an
author who dies merely ten years after creation (i.e., an extension effective
between years sixty to eighty post creation) is $0.67 for twenty years of one-
dollar payments. However, these twenty years of one-dollar payments are
worth only $0.16 for an author who dies forty years after creation (i.e.,
extension effective between years ninety to one-hundred-ten post creation).
Importantly, this effect will be compounded by the increased uncertainty of
far-future returns: to wit, the longer the pre-extension period, the lower the
risk-discounted PV of the extension.
142. Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 363 ("[T]he author who
publishes a work at age thirty and dies at age eighty has one hundred years of
copyright protection, and even in the unlikely event that the work will still
generate a substantial income in the one hundredth year, the present value of
that expectation will be virtually zero .... ") (discussing the PV of copyright
under the 1976 Act).
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than is objectively the case? After all, we have already shown that
the seemingly inferior lifetime-plus-years regime provides greater
incentives to create than traditional analyses recognize. However, a
review of the behavioral findings on intertemporal choice-namely,
decisions involving tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at
different points in time-provides little reason to believe that
boundedly rational authors will perceive the CTEA's extension as
providing greater incentives to create than traditional economic
analysis would predict. 1
43
Much like the empirical findings in other decision-making
domains, behavioral research on intertemporal choice shows that
people do not follow the normative principles (e.g., the "discounted
utility" model) suggested by economic theory when making
decisions involving intertemporal tradeoffs. 144
Hyperbolic discounting-that is, the finding that people do not
discount future outcomes at a constant rate-is probably the most
extensively researched intertemporal choice phenomenon.1
45
Empirical findings show that instead of applying a constant discount
rate, decision makers exhibit extremely high discount rates for
outcomes occurring in the short term, but that these rates decline
gradually over time. 14 6  In one typical early study, for example,
subjects specified the amount of money they would require in one
month, one year, and ten years to make them indifferent to receiving
$15 at present. The median responses were $20, $50, and $100
respectively, implying in turn median annual discount rates of 345%
143. Intertemporal choice has been one of the major foci of behavioral
decision-making research in the last two decades, providing many interesting
insights into this important and ubiquitous domain. See generally CHOICE
OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (an excellent
collection of articles introducing the economic theory and behavioral findings
on intertemporal choice).
144. The normative foundations for the commonly used framework for
intertemporal choice-the discounted utility model-are less sound than those
of its expected utility counterpart. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Drazen
Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation,
107 Q.J. ECON. 573 (1992) (discussing the discounted utility model and its
normative justification). For present purposes, however, we are only interested
in those robust descriptive findings on intertemporal choice, regardless of
whether the phenomena they record are normatively justified or not.
145. Id. at 573.
146. See Frederick et al., supra note 130, at 15-16.
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over the one-month horizon, 120% over the one year horizon, and
19% over the ten year horizon. 147 These findings show a typical time
discounting pattern that better fits a hyperbolic function than an
exponential model such as the NPV rule (or the more general
discounted utility model).I
48
A recent comprehensive review shows, however, that while
marginal discount rates clearly decline over time, the correlation
between time horizon and discount rate is almost exactly zero when
excluding studies of short time horizons (i.e., less than one year).
This review finds that beyond short time horizons, discount rates
remain stable, hovering around a 25% discount regression line. 
149
To make these findings more concrete, consider the valuation of
a one-dollar annual stream of income for an individual using a 25%
long-run discount rate. This individual values the first thirty years of
annual payments at $4.00. Any additional period beyond thirty
years, however, no matter how long, will not increase the present
value of the payment at all. 150
In other words, to the extent that potential authors exhibit time
discounting preferences similar to those observed in numerous
studies of intertemporal choice, they would be indifferent to the
additional future stream of payments the CTEA provides them.
151
147. See Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 204-05 (1981).
148. See, e.g., Kris N. Kirby, Bidding on the Future: Evidence Against
Normative Discounting of Delayed Rewards, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 54, 64-68 (1997); see also Frederick et al., supra note 130, at 15 & n.12
(citing various studies showing that hyperbolic functions fit the empirical
findings on intertemporal choice better than exponential functions). See
generally David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COGNITIVE SCI. (Lynn Nadel ed., 2002) (providing a good overview of
normative and descriptive models of intertemporal choice).
149. See Frederick et al., supra note 130, at 16 figs. la, lb (the estimated 0.8
discount factor in figure lb translates to a 25% discount rate, since the discount
factor is defined as 1/(l+r)).
150. This somewhat counterintuitive result is the outcome of the annuity
equation according to which the PV of an annuity is C/r(l+r)t, for an annual
cash flow of C, an interest rate of r, and a period of t. The PV limit of an
infinite annuity is therefore simply C/r. See, e.g., BREALY & MYERS, supra
note 48, at 38-41.
151. Two related and robust findings that are likely to contribute to this
effect are, first, the tendency to discount gains more than losses and, second,
the tendency to discount small sums much more than larger sums. See
generally Frederick et al., supra note 130, at 18-19 (summarizing the findings
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To wit, the extension provides additional payments to potential
copyright owners no earlier, and typically much later, than after the
passing of fifty years from creation, given the lifetime-plus-50-years
provision in the 1976 Act. At this far-future point, however, the
present value of each payment already approaches zero for an author
using a 25% discount rate. 152 Hence, the very low value of the
extension for rational economic actors using lower discount rates
diminishes to a nullity for authors exhibiting empirically observed
time preferences.' 
53
We nevertheless suggest that these striking conclusions may not
be fully applicable to the case at hand. One limitation of the
numerous studies of intertemporal choice is their focus on short- to
mid-length periods of time. The 25% discount factor, for example,
was estimated for the period between one to fifteen years into the
future. 154 Conceivably, when longer periods of payments are under
consideration, decision makers might apply lower discount rates
under which the CTEA's far-future extension would still provide
some additional marginal incentives to create. 155
on the "sign effect" and the "magnitude effect" and citing various studies
reporting these findings). Thus, because authors are likely to perceive future
income from authorship as gains, they are likely to discount them to a greater
degree. Additionally, since authors can anticipate only relatively small
average expected returns to creation, they would discount these future returns
even further. The latter effect, however, may be countered by authors'
optimistic bias regarding the ultimate future value of their creation. See, e.g.,
Tor & Oliar, supra note I (discussing this effect); cf the discussion of "soft"
information regarding the future value of creations, herein. See discussion
supra note 50.
152. Interestingly, the application of the estimated 25% discount rate yields a
value of $3.99 for a twenty-eight year annuity (and a limit value of $4.00 at
thirty years), precisely the duration of copyright protection under the 1790
Copyright Act. See Tor & Oliar, supra note 1.
153. Notice, moreover, that this conclusion holds even if the overall picture
emanating from present studies overestimates the discount rate significantly.
Using the equation for the limit value of an annuity we find that an extension
becomes ineffective beginning at year thirty-eight for a 20% discount rate,
with a total value of $5.00, and beginning at year sixty for a 15% discount rate,
with a total value of $6.67 (in the latter case, the added value between years
fifty and sixty is $0.01).
154. See Frederick et al., supra note 130, at 16 fig. lb.
155. Notice that the extension benefits authors with an average life
expectancy of twenty-five years after creation, for instance, only between years
seventy-five and ninety-five post creation. For this additional period to have
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In fact, a few recent studies examining discounting over the long
term provide some tentative support for this contrary argument,
finding lower discount rates for judgments of far-future monetary
outcomes, with rates lower than 10% for outcomes thirty years in the
future and almost no discounting at all for outcomes three hundred
years in the future.'
56
These findings may therefore suggest that the CTEA's far-future
extension may have an even greater, or at least no lesser, impact on
decision makers than standard economic principles dictate.
Nonetheless, evidence supporting the claim of very low discounting
rates in the long run is limited, and therefore requires further
replications and extensions before it can be relied on with
confidence.
157
Furthermore and importantly, even using a low 4% discount
rate-as some studies have found for a one-hundred years time
horizon 158-the marginal incentives provided by CTEA would still
be limited. To wit, the present value of annual payments under the
rule of the 1976 Act, assuming a twenty-five year average life
expectancy of authors and with this discount rate, would amount to
$23.68 for every $1 payment stream over the first seventy-five years
(i.e., twenty-five years of a lifetime plus the additional 50-year term).
The present value of the twenty-year extension, on the other hand,
would only amount to an additional $0.72. This sum, although
greater than the miniscule present value under the objectively
any incentivizing effect on creation, however, potential authors must not apply
an annual discount rate greater than 10.2%!
156. See Gretchen B. Chapman, Time Preferences for the Very Long Term,
108 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 95, 106-09 (2001) (Experiment 2: reporting similar
findings for non-monetary outcomes such as life-saving measures); see also
Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the
Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 248-57
(1994) (finding decreasing discount rates for life-saving measures); Maureen
L. Cropper et al., Rates of Time Preference for Saving Lives, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 469 (1992) (explaining that the public attaches a lower priority to lives
saved in the future, even when the time horizon is short) [hereinafter Cropper
et al., Preferences for Life Savings Program].
157. For other potential problems with interpreting the results of these
studies see Chapman, supra note 156, at 114-15.
158. See, e.g., Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs, supra
note 156.
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appropriate discount rate, still amounts to only 3% of the present
value of the pre-CTEA copyright period.
C. The Limits of Effective Lifetime-Plus-Years Extensions
The intertemporal discounting literature indicates that potential
authors are unlikely to value future streams of income much more
than the small value they would assign this income if they were to
use the normative NPV rule, although the specific factors
determining the magnitude of discount rates for far-future monetary
outcomes are yet to be identified. This unclear state of the empirical
findings on the extent of long-term discounting further highlights the
importance of our evidence and analysis on the role of optimistic
bias and subadditivity under the lifetime-plus-years regime. Without
the specific evidence on these behavioral forces we provide, it would
be difficult to determine whether the difference between the latter
regime and its fixed-term counterpart, even under the shorter
lifetime-plus-50-years rule of the 1976 Act, is truly significant for
potential authors. 
59
Insofar as the CTEA's prospective extension is concerned,
however, the behavioral factors underlying the unique impact of the
lifetime-plus-years regime are absent. Optimistic bias, which makes
potential authors prone to overestimate their future longevity, has no
impact on the perceived value of an extension of only the "years"
component of copyright duration. In the same vein, the strong effect
of subadditivity on judgment is unlikely to impact authors'
perceptions of the extension's value. Absent the addition of a
distinctive new component to the duration rule, the mere increase of
the number of "years"--an already existing category-would
probably not be perceived by potential authors as a conceptually
different representation.
To further buttress these logical conclusions, we conducted two
experiments in which participants rated the attractiveness of different
term increases for an already guaranteed stream of payments for
159. In fact, if these authors were to apply very high discount rates in the
long-term as well, they would not care at all about the differing effects of the
two regimes, which occur no earlier than fifty years after creation, even in the
extreme case of an author dying immediately after creation. See supra notes
149-52 and accompanying text.
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lifetime plus thirty years.' As expected, participants did not find an
extended period of lifetime plus seventy years significantly more
attractive than the shorter period of lifetime plus fifty years. 161
Furthermore, when determining their willingness to pay at
present for these far-future extensions, the participants exhibited
median implied discount rates of approximately 4%-4.5%. Their
median valuation of every dollar received annually by their heirs
between thirty and fifty years after their death amounted to a total of
$.50, while for a longer forty-year extension effective between years
thirty to seventy years after their death it amounted to $.80.162
These findings are in line with the recent evidence on
intertemporal choice in the long-term. Apparently, at least when
asked explicitly to value far-future monetary extensions, decision
makers apply a lower discount rate than they do in the short- and
mid-term. This lower rate, which is also lower than the discount
rates traditionally used by economists to determine the present value
of risk-free investments, nevertheless yields low present values for
far-future extensions. These low values, as evident from our
findings, are insufficient to make experimental participants show a
statistically significant preference for a forty-year extension
beginning thirty years and ending seventy years after their death over
a much shorter twenty-year extension beginning at the same time.
The lack of a difference between decision makers' reactions to the
two extensions, which result in payment periods comparable to the
pre-CTEA and post-CTEA duration rules respectively, further
highlight the unlikely impact of the extension on authors' incentives
to invest in creation. 63
Finally, our experimental findings also suggest that copyright
law could probably have obtained an effect as strong as the two
160. The thirty-year period was chosen to allow for a comparison of a stream
of lifetime plus fifty years to another of lifetime plus seventy years from a
common baseline.
161. See Tor & Oliar, supra note 1.
162. See id.
163. As a matter of fact, our experimental test probably overstates the effect
of the prospective extension, since it compares a forty-year to a twenty-year
extension. In reality, however, the effect of the CTEA on potential individual
authors should be measured by comparing a lifetime-plus-50-years period to a
lifetime-plus-70-years period. Under this comparison, the small (though
already insignificant) difference between pre- and post-CTEA regimes is likely
to shrink even further.
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lifetime-plus-years rules we tested by breaking the duration rule
explicitly into additional categories. Such an additional breakup
could have been accomplished, for example, by defining the term of
copyright as the lifetime of the author plus the lifetime of the
authors' children and an additional twenty years after the children's
death. Under this rule, the "lifetime" component would generate
optimistic bias similar to that we observed under the extant regime,
and the breaking of the period into the latter category plus another
"children's lifetime" category would have likely generated
subadditivity as well. 164 Ironically, such a definition could have
resulted in a shorter average copyright period (since the average
author would probably not have children living more than fifty years
after her death), thereby decreasing the direct social costs of
copyright while increasing, or at least maintaining, its present
incentive-providing effect. 165
V. CONCLUSION
Our behavioral analysis in this Article reveals that the extant,
seemingly inferior lifetime-plus-years regime provides boundedly
rational authors with increased incentives for investing in creation.
These real-life authors are prone to overestimating the duration of
copyright their works will enjoy under the lifetime-plus-years
regime. They are therefore likely to make greater investments in
creation under this regime, whose attendant social costs may also be
greater than the costs of a comparable fixed-term regime.
We have also shown that the unique behavioral impact of the
lifetime-plus-years regime does not extend to the additional twenty
years provided by the CTEA, a conclusion supported by empirical
164. See id. In fact, our experimental findings show that this later rule is
perceived as equally or even more attractive, and is valued more highly by
participants than the other two rules.
165. We do not suggest, however, that a "lifetime-plus-children's-lifetime"
regime would be overall superior to the extant rule. Although that may be the
case, such a conclusion would also have to take into account the other costs
and benefits of this regime (e.g., the likely increase in tracing costs it would
generate, the disincentive to authors not planning to have children, or the
inducement of authors to bear children later in life to obtain extended
copyright protection). We also do not suggest that any long-term copyright
protection is socially optimal overall.
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findings from the behavioral literature as well as our own focused
experimental tests.
The traditional economic aspects of our findings regarding far-
future extensions within a given regime can probably be extended to
the case of works made for hire as well. Such works have also been
awarded a twenty-year extension to the fixed-term of copyright they
enjoyed before the CTEA, whose effective impact takes place only
after the passage of seventy-five years from creation at the earliest.'
According to the NPV rule, the per-dollar present value of the added
income between years seventy-five and ninety-five is very small,
even when using a highly conservative annual interest rate of 5%.
167
This traditional view might well apply to those firms deciding to
invest in works made for hire, whose evaluation of far-future benefits
could plausibly accord with the normative rule.' 68 For such works,
therefore, the CTEA's prospective extension also appears to provide
very limited marginal incentives to create.' 69  The constitutional
analysis of the CTEA in Eldred could benefit from this finding when
examining whether the Act is within the mandate given to Congress
to enact copyright legislation. 170 Thus, although the constitutional
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000) (assuming a work has been published
immediately after its creation, because § 302(c) protects these works for the
shorter of ninety-five years from publication or one-hundred-twenty years from
creation, while the 1976 Act's rule provided only the shorter of seventy-five
years from publication or one hundred years from creation).
167. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
168. Note, however, that the behavioral finance literature provides ample
evidence for boundedly rational judgment and decision-making in and by
firms, even in intensely competitive settings. See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi &
Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110
Q.J. EcoN. 73 (1995) (discussing specific evidence of short time horizons in
firms' investment decision-making); Tor, supra note 9 (showing that bounded
rationality can survive and prosper even while the market disciplines many
boundedly rational actors).
169. Note that for decision makers applying the NPV rule with a reasonable
discount factor, taking into account the risks involved in investment in
creation, even the pre-CTEA regime may provide little additional incentives to
create as compared to far shorter duration regimes.
170. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. Another important policy question that
is beyond the present analysis is whether society can legitimately exploit the
bounded rationality of potential creators to provide them with greater
incentives to create without increasing the objective value of their copyright.
On the one hand, such a policy arguably abuses governmental power to benefit
society at the expense of some of its citizens. On the other hand, one may
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challenge to the Act has focused on the CTEA's retrospective
extension, both this extension and the Act as a whole have been
justified, to a degree, by the asserted need to provide incentives for
new creation via the prospective extension.
171
In this Article, we have applied, for the first time, a behavioral
economic analysis to fundamental features of copyright law, solving
the puzzle of the unique, seemingly inferior duration regime of
copyright for individual authors. We have relied on our analysis,
together with additional empirical findings and new experimental
evidence, to expose the limited incentive-providing efficacy of the
CTEA.
In addition, our analysis also indicates the possibility of
developing an empirical foundation for determining of the proper
boundaries of copyright law based on a meaningful, testable
definition of its incentive-providing mandate.
Finally, we hope our analysis will alert legal scholars who study
those numerous constitutional doctrines that seek to impact
individuals' conduct, to the important, yet unexplored, role that
behavioral insights can and should play in these constitutional
domains.
assert that the behavioral impact of a lifetime-plus-years regime truly increases
the utility of creators and accords with their preferences, although it will not
benefit most of them as much as they expect. Cf Jolls et al., supra note 10, at
1541-45 (discussing the possibility of governmental reliance on and
exploitation of the bounded rationality of citizens as a basis for regulation).
171. See supra note 14 and the accompanying text.
